Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
Pomona Senior Theses

Pomona Student Scholarship

2017

Deconstructing “Deviance” and “Disorder” as
Systems of Domination: Chicago Public Schools as
a Case Study of the Effects of Zero Tolerance
Discipline Policies on Educational Outcomes in
US Schools
Maya Kaul

Recommended Citation
Kaul, Maya, "Deconstructing “Deviance” and “Disorder” as Systems of Domination: Chicago Public Schools as a Case Study of the
Effects of Zero Tolerance Discipline Policies on Educational Outcomes in US Schools" (2017). Pomona Senior Theses. 184.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/pomona_theses/184

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Pomona Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pomona Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Deconstructing “Deviance” and “Disorder” as Systems of Domination:
Chicago Public Schools as a Case Study of the Effects of Zero Tolerance Discipline Policies on
Educational Outcomes in US Schools

Maya Kaul

Pomona College
Philosophy, Politics, & Economics Senior Thesis
Professor David Menefee-Libey & Professor Eleanor Brown
21 April 2017

Kaul i

Kaul ii

Dedication
This project is for Francisco—one of the seventh grade students I was fortunate to spend
time with and learn from this past summer in East Palo Alto—and all of the students like him,
who find themselves pushed through the cracks of the US education pipeline by forces far
beyond their control.

Kaul ii

Kaul iii

Preface
The rise of “zero tolerance” discipline practices in US primary and secondary schools has
become increasingly well documented by the media and empirical studies. Despite the extensive
scholarship that has emerged from these conversations, many of these analyses are limited in
their scope and do not connect the phenomena of zero tolerance in schools to the diverse, shifting
forces at play within American politics and policy today. As such, the goal of this work is to
synthesize ideas about zero tolerance across disciplines by integrating historical thought,
philosophical frameworks of punishment, shifting policy goals within the US education system,
the sociological constructions of “deviance” and “disorder” in the context of the US criminal
justice system, and empirical data directly from a school district to develop particular policy
recommendations accordingly. The primary research question of this analysis is: What are the
effects of zero tolerance discipline policies on educational outcomes? To answer this question,
Chicago Public Schools will be employed as a case study from which lessons for the nation at
large will be drawn. Ultimately, this analysis ends up revealing the ways in which zero tolerance
policies stem from much deeper forces at play between dominant and marginal groups, and what
comes to be defined as “deviance” in relation to a socially constructed system of “order.”
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Introduction
“Every man in my family has been locked up. Most days I feel like it doesn’t matter what I
do, how hard I try—that’s my fate, too.”
—11th-grade African American student, Berkeley, California (Rethinking Schools).

In 2009, a group of a couple dozen middle school students at Perspectives Charter
School in Chicago took part in the age-old adolescent tradition of a lunchtime food fight.
It was like any other food fight capable of being carried out by a group of 11 to 15 year olds,
until the on-campus police officer at Perspectives decided to call in for additional backup to
deal with the situation. Before long, there was a large police presence on campus to deal with
the food fight. The police officers then identified the situation as “reckless conduct”—a
misdemeanor in Chicago—and rounded up and arrested 25 of the students involved (Saulny).
The students were then held at “[…] the Gresham District police station for over five hours
before [their parents] were notified” (Bartosik). One parent of two of the eight-grade girls
who had been involved in the food fight shares that her daughters “[…] were handcuffed,
slammed in a wagon, had their mugshots taken and [were] treated like real criminals”
(Saulny). Perhaps not surprisingly then, the same school responsible for the arrests features a
video on their main website of students, teachers, and even Arne Duncan talking about the
“warzone” of violence they claim plagues Chicago—all as a promotion for a weekly class the
Perspectives offers called “A Disciplined Life” (Perspectives Charter School).
The story of Perspectives High School, and of the criminalization of what used to be
considered nothing more than “kids being kids,” is unfortunately not an anomaly, but instead
a part of a much bigger story. Stories like the arrest of the students at Perspectives are among
a series of popular news stories of K-12 students receiving disproportionate punishments

Kaul 2
relative to their “misconduct.” In many ways though, the focus on these extreme cases of
punishment undermines and diverts attention away from the broader, more systemic, forces
of hyper-criminalization in America today: entire communities’ behaviors become coded as
“deviant” or characteristic of “disorder” in relation to the “norm” of the dominant
communities. Therefore, to understand the forces that led up to the arrests of the middle
school students at Perspectives, it is critical to look more closely at the relation of what are
called “zero tolerance” discipline policies in K-12 schools to the systems of inequality they
work to (re)produce.
Ever since the 1983 publication, “A Nation At Risk: The Imperative for Educational
Reform,” there has been a pronounced culture of fear surrounding K-12 schools in the US.
Published in the wake of supposed educational declines post-Sputnik in the US, the report
reflects the anxieties that existed around the US losing its place as a world superpower and
the subsequent displacement of those fears onto the expectations of American schools. The
report claims, “[…] the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by
a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people” (NCEE).
Though the focus of this piece was on the educational outcomes of the US on the national
stage, this report has had lasting implications in a much broader sense: fostering a dismal
narrative about the US education system as always being “at risk” and somehow under threat
by some totalizing Other force. It does not take much to see the prevalence of this language
across conversations regarding the US education system. It has become a popular quip for
politicians to displace any and all problems that threaten US’ position as a world superpower
onto US schools. Accordingly, there is a way in which the public consensus on US schooling
seems to be that schools must be failing. At the heart of all of these fears, though, lies the
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heart of American competitiveness to optimize “educational outcomes” (i.e. test scores). This
fear has generated a public protectiveness over the safety and achievement of US schools,
such that anything seen as a threat to schools’ well-being is quickly thrown under attack.
Inherent in the narrative of US schools today, then, is a sense that we must protect ourselves
from some ambiguous, and loosely-defined Other.
In the wake of increased school violence and threats to the educational outcomes of
US’ schools, this “Other” has become students who act in ways that are determined “deviant”
by the state. To be a student who misbehaves within this system that is already “at risk” is to
threaten the already very delicate project of the US education system. The “risk” has shifted
from lying within the larger institutional forces driving US education to individual students
who have seemingly become the risk itself. This risk is still, in many ways, intricately tied to
the educational outcomes of the state. The narrative is that “deviant” behavior from the “atrisk” students takes away from the learning opportunities of the students who are “just at
school to learn.” The reality of the situation turns out to be much more complex, so these
narratives help to explain the particular historical context that has given rise to what is now
referred to as “zero tolerance” school discipline policies. Given that the majority of students
targeted by such policies are often students of color, English Learners, migrants, etc., the
construction of these students as the dangerous “Other” is a natural extension of more
pervasive systems of power.
Understanding the rise of zero tolerance school discipline policies at the US gets at
the heart of several, critical intersectional questions of this particular political moment: What
is the role of dualism in the American political system, in particular with regards to
constructions of race and “deviant behavior”? What is relationship between US schools and
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the prison system, and how do school discipline policies reinforce this connection? What are
the goals of education, and how do they intersect with managing and policing behaviors?
How can philosophical theories of punishment be used to create models of school discipline
that protect the socio-emotional well being of students? Studying the rise and impact of zero
tolerance policies in schools, therefore, gets to the core of education policy’s intersections
with philosophical, pedagogical, and political thought.
In order to begin to answer these questions, this analysis seeks to perform a policy
analysis of zero tolerance discipline models in the US. More specifically, the primary
research question of this work is: What are the effects of zero tolerance policies on
educational outcomes (specifically, graduation outcomes) in US schools? This analysis will,
therefore, begin in the first chapter by providing a thorough background on zero tolerance
historically, philosophically, etc. and provide a working definition of what such policies
entail. The second chapter will then proceed to provide a literature review on the
determinants of educational outcomes and the existing casual narratives regarding the effects
of zero tolerance on educational outcomes. The third chapter will introduce the case study of
Chicago Public Schools for the econometric analysis of this district’s data in the fourth
chapter. This will all conclude with a discussion of policy recommendations, based on the
findings of this analysis and of research on alternatives to zero tolerance. All of this work
will critically put into question the authority of the social constructions of “deviancy” and
“disorder” that fuel hyper criminalization in schools, and the US criminal justice system at
large.
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Chapter 1
Historical Context and Framework of “Zero Tolerance”

To engage in any worthwhile discussion of the effects of zero tolerance policies on
educational outcomes, it is critical to first establish a working definition of what “zero
tolerance” means in the context of K-12 education policy and to understand the historical
context that gave rise to these policies in the United States. As such, this chapter provides a
history of the rise of zero tolerance discipline policies that is grounded in relation to other
parallel, mutually reinforcing policy shifts. The first section of this chapter traces the origins
of zero tolerance in the context of the media-driven hysteria of the War on Drugs. The
following section attempts to contextualize these changes within the larger goals embraced
within the US education system. From there, the analysis considers philosophical theories of
punishment at play in school discipline, so as to locate zero tolerance policies within
philosophical frameworks of punishment. The following section more closely identifies how
zero tolerance policies manifest at a school level and settles on a working definition for “zero
tolerance.” Then, there is a brief policy overview of zero tolerance school discipline policies
in the US, and the chapter closes with an introduction to the case study on Chicago Public
Schools. The goal of this chapter is, therefore, is to synthesize the many moving parts of
school discipline policies and to establish a multi-level framework for breaking down what
zero tolerance discipline polices mean historically, philosophically, ideologically, and in
terms of specific policies.
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A. Historical Origins of “Zero Tolerance”
The political climate that fostered the rise of zero tolerance can be perhaps best
understood by looking more closely at the “moral panic” rhetoric responsible for the
inception of zero tolerance policing during the War on Drugs. In his theory on the role of
presidential rhetoric in the construction of moral panic, James Hawdon uses the War on
Drugs to demonstrate that there are three distinct phases of creating moral panic. The first
phase, “Communitarianism and the Call to Action” involves the identification of a specific
threat, a collective action that will eradicate that threat, and an enemy responsible for
propagating the threat (427). The ultimate irony of such rhetoric is that it is through the focus
on community that the construction and exclusion of an Other becomes possible in later
phases of the moral panic construction. The second phase of creating moral panic, according
to Hawdon, is “Adopting a Dualistic Model of Use” (430). He suggests that, in order for the
energy of collective action to be sustained in ways that will become reflected in policy,
presidential rhetoric (and really, all political rhetoric) must sustain the panic. In the context of
the Reagan Administration and the War on Drugs, “proactive-punitive” and “proactiverehabilitative” approaches were pitted against each other to sustain the moral panic; however,
as the panic escalated, there were shifts to embrace more punitive measures in order to
adequately address the seriousness of the “threat” (431). Finally, the third stage of Hawdon’s
model is “Implementation and the Ending of Moral Panics” (431). At this stage, ambiguously
harsh policies may be introduced so as to satisfy the fears driving the moral panic and deal
with public concern. It was at this point in the War on Drugs that zero tolerance first emerged
in the American political consciousness:
Expanding the enemy [of the War on Drugs] to include occasional users, the Reagan
administration launched the Zero Tolerance Policy (ZTP). ZTP, being punitively
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oriented and based on a criminal model of use, called for the confiscation of all
property on which any amount of a controlled substance was found. (432)
The term “zero tolerance” originated during this period as a loose “rhetorical device, used to
signal uncompromising authoritative action by the State and its agencies, against an external
and internal enemy” (Newburn and Jones 222-223). Therefore, integral to the narrative of a
“moral panic” is the existence of some enemy whose differences to the dominant group are
defined in largely dualistic terms. Understanding the nature of the moral panic generated in
the US War on Drugs is critical to contextualizing the rise of zero tolerance policies in
schools, because the latter largely grew out of the former.
One of the first policies to be specifically identified as “zero tolerance” was the
“program developed in 1986 by Peter Nunez, the U.S. attorney in San Diego [that called for]
impounding seagoing vessels carrying any amount of drugs” (Skiba and Knesting 18-19).
The loose language of this policy quickly spread to policymakers who were constructing a
broad range of other policies, ranging “from environmental pollution and trespassing to
skateboarding, homelessness, and boom boxes” (19). The rhetoric of “zero tolerance”—
inspired by the language of San Diego’s policy—gained further prominence under the
Reagan administration’s oversight of the War on Drugs when the US Customs
Commissioner, William Von Raab, adopted a zero tolerance approach for the Customs
Department (Newburn and Jones 223). A similar logic was also at the heart of the proceeding
presidential administration of George H. W. Bush, who, in his first television address to the
nation, claimed: “Zero tolerance isn’t just a policy, it’s an attitude. My administration will be
telling the [drug] dealers: whatever we have to do, we’ll do, but your day is over, you’re
history” (Baum 244). These policies thrived under the veiled pragmatism of utilitarianism
that manipulates a fear of some ambiguous enemy to justify the state’s suspension of due
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process for particular communities of people. As the harshness of the rhetoric of “zero
tolerance” suggests, these policies oftentimes lack an upper limit, so to speak, on how far
rights can be curtailed so as to protect “American society” from the moral threat. Moral
panic-oriented policies, therefore, often depend on notions of Good versus Bad and Self
versus Other/Enemy, that dichotomize groups into systematically opposing forces. The way
that students’ identities come to be constructed alongside the threat of violence in US schools
ends up being no different.
To understand the transition of this logic of “zero tolerance” into school policies that
followed the War on Drugs, it is helpful to put the specific rhetoric that has been employed to
create this duality into the context of school discipline. Policymakers who have historically
pushed for zero tolerance policies in schools have benefited from the public discourse—and
in particular, the rhetoric being strategically employed by the media—that governs
definitions of “crime” and “criminals.” According to a study reported in 1998 by the
Berkeley Media Studies Group that involved over 200 hours in observations of 26 local news
stations in California, 77 percent of stories did not involve youth or violence, but of those
involving violence, 68 percent involved youth (Woodruff 43-44). These media
representations “linked ‘teen super-predators’, gang-violence and the crack cocaine
‘epidemic,’ and all were unmistakably characterized as issues of race” (Heitzeg 5). There are
multiple potential readings of this phenomenon: either there are internal features of youth
that dispose them to violence, or there are external factors unique to the climates these youth
exist within, or it is a combination of both factors. From the former understanding, youth are
presented in the media as being morally undeveloped and therefore the ultimate sources of
violence. These representations have tremendous power and have become codified within the
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juvenile justice system’s formal definition of children as people with “less than fully
developed moral and cognitive capacities” (Insley 1072). According to the latter explanation,
there is a level of disorder in the climates “super-predators” exist within that is responsible
for the violence. It follows from this understanding that, if this external “disorder” is
controlled, then the violence will also be controlled.
This language of “disorder” can be incredibly dangerous as a policing strategy, as it
tends to be heavily coded by nativist understandings of race, language, gender, sexuality, etc.
One of the impacts of media’s control over crime narratives is that they are given partial
agency over the biases that become internalized in response to the moral panic. For example,
another experimental study reported by the Berkeley Media Studies Group found that “A
mere five-second exposure to a mug shot of Black and Latino youth offenders (in a 15minute newscast) raises levels of fear among viewers, increases their support for ‘get-tough’
crime policies, and promotes racial stereotyping” (Gilliam, Jr. and Iyengar 46).1 In part
because of these same dualistic media representation, “disorder” has come to be a loose
signifier for low-income, communities of color, and in particular, Black and Latino male
youth. In his book Punished, sociologist Victor Rios proposes the phrase “youth control
complex” to describe what he identifies as “a system in which schools, police, probation
officers, families, community centers, the media, businesses, and other institutions
systematically treat young people’s everyday behaviors as criminal activity” (xiv). This
phenomenon captures the ways in which “disorder” becomes a symbol that allows the media

1

As more of a context on the study referenced, the specific objective of the study was to examine the impact of
the “superpredator news frame” in all groups watched the same newscast and story, except the race of the youth
varied between groups. The first group of participants watched a clip in which the alleged murderer was and
African-American or Latino male, the second group’s alleged murderer was either Asian or white, the third
group’s tape included no information on the race of the perpetrator, and a control group did not see any crime
story in their newscast (Gilliam, Jr. and Iyenger 45).
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to over-hype the effects of youth crime by hyper-criminalizing certain youth,
disproportionately by race. This “disorder” is easily manipulated by those with the political
capital to abuse it, particularly in a context where American media has already created a
general culture of fear when it comes to crime.2 This fear of crime, coupled with the youth
control complex, fosters a political climate that is complacent with the harshness of zero
tolerance policies.
Understanding the power of these media representations of crime helps provide the
context for understanding the impact of the April 1999 Columbine High School massacre on
school discipline policy nationally. The school shooting in Colorado—perpetrated by two
male students in the high school—led to the death of 12 students, 1 teacher, and the shooters,
and became the most closely watched news event of the year in the United States (Birkland
and Lawrence 1405).3 Columbine was certainly not the first school shooting of its sort, but it
was significant because of the way the media used the story to construct moral panic: “The
media framed Columbine as the prime indicator of a growing national problem of school
violence—quite apart from the actual statistics on school violence, which showed no
significant increase in such events (Muschetrt, 2007b)” (1407). Interestingly, Columbine did
not cause the emergence of new federal policies to protect communities against school
violence; instead, existing policies were just more rapidly and aggressively implemented at
the school-level, post-Columbine (1412). While Columbine did not result in new federal
policies, there were still very real consequences on the increased fear of violence at schools,
as evidenced by the “beefing up [on] school security and cracking down on juvenile

According to multiple studies, TV viewers who watch more than four hours of TV a day “overestimate the
crime rate, the likelihood of crime victimization, and the extent of stranger related violence” (Heitzeg 6).
3
More specifically, according to the Pew Research Center, 86% of the public paid close attention to the media
stories on Columbine (Birkland and Lawrence 1405).
2
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offenders” (1412). This increased security presence and the fear-driven understanding of K12 students as a threat to safety are more difficult to measure than particular “policies” are,
but so much of what “zero tolerance” has come to signify in practice is this very culture of
hyper criminalization. The presence of such a culture is evidenced by the fact that “68% of
students around the country between ages 12 and 15 reported the presence of security guards
and/or assigned police officers in their schools (an increase from 54% in 1999”
(Advancement Project 15). Therefore, while “zero tolerance” can be defined narrowly in
terms of what it means for the amount and severity of formal systems of punishment (i.e.
suspensions, expulsions, police notifications), these formal systems of discipline also have
wider effects on more informal system of control like surveillance.
In addition to understanding the ways that media representations contributed to the
highly dualistic depiction of youth preceding the rise of zero tolerance school policies, it is
equally necessary to understand the special role that schools have historically played in the
broader scheme of conservative government politics. In The Abandoned Generation, critical
theorist Henry Giroux focuses in on the Bush Administration, and argues:
[…] public education has become a battleground and litmus test for conservatives and
business leaders in their attempt to expand the ideology of the market and the control
of capital over all aspects of society. […] Using the rhetoric of ‘compassionate
conservatism,’ Bush claims that his educational reform package is aimed at
addressing the needs of disadvantaged children, closing the gap between rich and
poor kids, improving accountability, and offering schools more financial resources to
improve their performance. (72)
This spreading market ideology is evidenced by the ways that schools have been increasingly
commoditized into profit-making institutions. For example, at the start of the Bush
administration, the chancellor of New York City schools proposed that schools begin
fundraising through on-campus advertising (73). Though a perhaps seemingly innocuous
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suggestion, this policy was just a representation of a more deeply-engrained mind shift in the
political climate of America during the Bush administration: “The overt message here is
clear: treat schools like a pseudo-marketplace, bribe superintendents into turning schools into
testing factories, and punish them if they do not succeed in raising scores” (73). The problem
here does not lie in the intrinsic dangers of corporatizing education alone, but also in the
ways that the Bush administrations’ political narrative caused a shift in the very goals of
education, from schools being a place to foster democratic ideals to being revenuegenerating institutions:
No longer a space for relating the self to the obligations of public life, and social
responsibility to the demands of critical and engaged citizenship, schools are viewed
as an all-encompassing horizon for producing market identities, values, and those
privatizing pedagogies that inflate the importance of individual competition. (80)
Moreover, this logic has had very real consequences on the ways that student behavior has
become monitored and policed in classrooms. Certain funding has been distributed on the
basis of schools’ ability to “remove violent or persistently disruptive students from the
classroom” and adopt a zero-tolerance policy for such students (95). The larger implications
of this narrative is that it allowed for the Bush administration to displace the responsibility
for the causes of this violence to schools themselves, suggesting that “guns, poverty, racism,
the hyper-commercialism of corporate culture, and the brutal machismo of American society
have nothing to do with the problems of violence that students sometime face in and out of
schools” (95).

B. Contextualizing Zero Tolerance within Changings Goals of Education
This apparent shift from schools being seen as a space to cultivate democratic ideals
to being a place that replicates the market dynamics of the neoliberal state reveals the
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changing, underlying goals of the American education system. In his article, “Public Goods,
Private Goods: The American Struggle over Educational Goals,” David Labaree posits that
the history of the American education system can be understood by the rise, and conflict,
between the three goals of the system: democratic equality, social efficiency, and social
mobility (41). Each of these goals arose from particular historical circumstances that reflect
the broader political factors of their time: democratic equality can be traced to common
schools in the mid-nineteenth century’s emphasis on using schools to cultivate citizens, social
efficiency grew out of the growing market-forces of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries and focus on vocationalism to prepare workers, and social mobility illuminates the
shift to the view of education as private—rather than public—and as a means of fostering
consumers (43-50). Labaree contends that coalitions can be formed along the lines of no
more than two of these goals, because attempting to do any more than that fundamentally
compromises one’s ability to achieve any of goals effectively; as a result, conservatives often
seek to progress social efficiency, whereas progressive coalitions advocate for a combination
of democratic equality and social mobility (63). Labaree’s argument relies on an
understanding that “the central problems with American education are not pedagogical or
organizational or social or cultural in nature but are fundamentally political” (40).
When Labaree’s analysis was published in the late 1990s, he argued that the social
mobility was winning this value battle in American politics and policy, but also that the US
was trying and failing to implement all three goals concurrently because of the competing
coalitions.4 By applying his framework to the Bush administration’s more market-orientated
approach to schools, one can see the ways in which that shift represents a pivot back from
This summary of Labaree’s account was taken directly from my first paper I wrote for my Education Politics
and Policy class with Professor Menefee-Libey, taken Spring 2017. That paper involved summarizing Labaree’s
article and then comparing it to another piece we had read that semester.
4
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democratic equality goals to social efficiency, in which students are valued for their role as
workers. This is all to suggest that the rise of zero tolerance has to be understood at the
intersection of various dynamics—political dualism, social construction of “disorder,” media
representations of youth and crime, changing political coalitions, and the broader educational
goals of the US. In this way, it is important to trace how political ideals have been mirrored
and/or reproduced in the context of schools, because this reveals more about the political
climate than can be gained from looking at strictly-defined “political institutions” alone.
Schools can serve as a sort of “ground zero” for much broader political projects, such as
addressing concerns related to social mobility, racial integration, and the policing of various
marginalized identities.

C. Theories of Punishment
Zero tolerance policies also exist within a particular philosophical schism regarding
theories of punishment, so it is helpful to locate them within this context, so as to better
understand the logic behind such policies. To do so, the two leading theories of
punishment—retributivism and rehabilitation/restorative justice—must first be defined.
These theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive in the sense that most systems of
punishment in the real world incorporate aspects of both frameworks in practice; however,
they are often framed as diametrically opposed and irreconcilable with each other because
they are grounded in opposing understandings on the malleability of human behavior. And,
while these theories of punishment have been since paired with social scientific empirical
studies regarding the effectiveness of different theories in practice, these theories of
punishment ultimately grew out of philosophical frameworks concerning the meaning of
justice. Therefore, to understand the role of these theories in relation to zero tolerance, it is
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necessary to ground this analysis within its broader philosophical context. There are long and
extensive intellectual histories for both theories of punishment, so this analysis will just
provide a cursory glance at these theories to ground the rest of the analysis.

Retributive Justice
The underlying “eye for an eye” logic that drives retributive justice is perhaps as old
as human society itself. The idea is that, if one causes some harm, one must be punished and
held responsible for that harm (and even potentially have harm caused to oneself in return).
Within justifications for retributive justice, there are multiple philosophical approaches taken.
For one, there is often a utilitarian logic underlying retributive justice in practice—i.e. society
punishes those who violate the law, in order to deter them from committing future harm. This
utilitarian, retributive account is ultimately the logic behind zero tolerance discipline policies.
The goal of punishment, according to such a utilitarian lens, is to minimize harm and/or
optimize happiness (via the deterrence of future crimes). However, the logic of retributivism
does not have to be understood through a utilitarian framework. And in fact, Immanuel Kant
provides one of the most foundational philosophical justifications for retributivism through a
strictly means-based, deontological account of morality. More specifically, Kant suggests
that, as human beings, our wills are governed by a “categorical imperative”5 to follow the
principal: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim
should become a universal law” (Kant xvii-xviii). According to Kant’s logic, therefore,

The notion of a categorical imperative, though critical to Kant’s framework, is not necessary to go into further
in this context. All that is important to understand at this point is that categorical imperatives, as contrasted to
hypothetical imperatives, establish absolute moral rules. In further clarifying the difference between the two
imperatives, Kant writes, “Now, if the action would be good merely as a means to something else, the
imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as good in itself, hence as necessary in a will that in itself
conforms to reason, as its principle, then it is categorical” (28).
5
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punishing to reach some other end (such as deterrence) cannot be justified because it uses
people as a means to ends; instead, punishment must be applied proportional to the harm
caused in order to condemn some action (the crime) from becoming universal law.
While this is an extremely cursory overview of some of the arguments made within
the literature on retributive justice, these positions are referenced in order to demonstrate how
restorative justice models can make both positive and negative claims: “The positive desert
claim holds that wrongdoers morally deserve punishment for their wrongful acts” and the
negative claim holds that, “Those who have done no wrong may not be punished” (Walen).
In other words, the backbone understanding of retributivism, regardless of whether one
approaches it through deontological, utilitarian, or some other ethical framework, is designed
to punish only those who carry the guilt of a particular action. If a system of punishment
either does not punish the guilty, or wrongfully punishes the innocent, then it would be
failing to respect the philosophical underpinnings for this theory of punishment. The logic of
zero tolerance, therefore, does not always neatly fit within this Kantian account of
retributivism, because it often justifies disproportionate punishment and using humans as
ends to avoid more harm.

Restorative Justice/Rehabilitation
The restorative justice (RJ) approach to punishment is thought to have originated in
the “premodern native cultures of the South Pacific and Americans” in which cultures
“emphasized the offender’s accountability for the harm they caused, along with a plan for
repairing the hurt and restoring the offender to acceptance” (Fronius et al. 5). The model of
restorative justice can be understood as a sort of meeting in between retribution and
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rehabilitation models (Braithwaite 4). Inherent in this logic, therefore, is a focus on the act,
rather than the individual, as the source of harm. This detachment of guilt represents a
distinct shift away from dualistic understandings of children as either distinctly “criminal” or
“good” and are incompatible with zero tolerance practices:
RJ proponents argue that a strict focus on ‘paying the offender back,’ which is often
the philosophy behind exclusionary punishment, can leave the victim without closure
or fail to bring resolution to the harmful situation. […] Such a philosophy [of RJ],
advocates state, can open the door for more communication and for resolutions to the
situation that do not involve exclusionary punishments like suspension. (10)
In practice, that means that restorative justice models often entail a trade-off with
punishments like suspensions, expulsions, and police notification and alternative practices
like community peace circles. Instead of trying to eliminate students from their school
communities to “protect” the safety of the rest of the school, this model views all students as
integral to their school communities and values their well-beings accordingly. This model is
not unique to the school-context, and has also been introduced at various levels of the US
criminal justice system at large. Restorative models draw from the logic of rehabilitation—
i.e. that all humans are subjects to particular conditions that cause their behavior and
therefore they must be treated rather than punished—and incorporates this way of thinking
into the context of community ties. In order to restore any harm caused by violating these
community ties, restorative justice understands that the community itself must be treated, in a
way similar to the individual is treated within a system of strict rehabilitation. It is important
to understand the restorative justice model for the purpose of this analysis, so as to locate
zero tolerance on the spectrum of philosophical frameworks of punishment.
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D. Defining “Zero Tolerance” Policies in the Context of US Schools
Prior to settling on a particular definition of zero tolerance, it is necessary to
distinguish between the various forms of punishment that schools traditionally employ in
response to whatever they choose to label as behavioral misconduct, or “deviancy.”
Understanding the relative severity of these forms of punishment helps to understand the
implications of schools opting for one punishment over another. Most schools identify
various levels of seriousness in misconduct that result in three different sorts of punishment.
The first—and typically understood as the least severe—form of punishment is suspensions.
Important to note is that there is a difference between in-school suspensions (ISS) and out-ofschool suspensions (OSS), where the first method typically involves “a student [being]
removed from the classroom and compelled to stay in an ISS center for a variable length of
time, ranging from part of a day to several days in a row” and the latter refers to removing a
student from school premises, typically for no longer than for a period of ten days (Blomberg
2). Because OSS is typically understood as the more severe of the two forms of suspensions,
observing the increase in the ratio of OSS to ISS in a given school district can be a helpful
proxy for measuring and defining zero tolerance. Distinguishing between OSS and ISS in the
context of this analysis is also critical, given that existing literature suggests that OSS in
particular results in students’ emotional and academic needs both not being met, particularly
for students who are characterized as “at-risk” (4). The second level of punishment that
traditionally follows a ten-day suspension is expulsion, or the removal of a student from their
school for up to 80 days.6 And finally, the third, and most extreme form of punishment a
school could opt for, is police notification. This last measure is particularly important when
contextualizing the relationship of zero tolerance policies to the trend referred to as the
6

The possible length of an expulsion varies based on the individual school’s policy.
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“school-to-prison pipeline”—i.e. the growing connection between students’ behavioral
misconduct in schools and juvenile and adult criminal justice systems. All of these various
forms of punishment are noted because understanding the relative severity of each of them
allows one to build a more nuanced definition of zero tolerance. Because zero tolerance
exists both through and beyond codified state and federal laws as a culture, one can measure
and define the existence of zero tolerance by the relative increase of more severe forms of
punishment, such as OSS, expulsion, and especially police notifications, as a representation
of the broader nature of these policies.
Given this understanding, this analysis will embrace the definition of zero tolerance
proposed in a publication produced by the the National Education Association (NEA):
A zero tolerance policy assigns explicit, predetermined punishments to specific
violations of school rules, regardless of the situation or context of the behavior. In
many cases, punishment for a violation under the policy is severe, such as suspension
or expulsion from school (Boccanfuso and Kuhfeld 1).
In other words, zero tolerance policies are those that do not always seek to factor in the
situational factors behind an act of misconduct, and instead apply (oftentimes harsh)
punishments for any minor infraction of a law. The nature of zero tolerance is, therefore,
intricately tied to dualist understandings of youth in the context of crime—either one did or
one did not violate a rule, and the punishment that follows is predetermined. In many cases,
this has ended up with students receiving harsher punishments than they would have
previously—i.e. more suspensions and expulsions—rather than non-punitive treatments, such
as just having a conversation with students and having them reflect on their actions.
According to this definition of zero tolerance, the scope of such policies is fairly large
nationally; the National Center on Education Statistics (NCES) has found that “94 percent of
all schools have zero-tolerance policies for weapons or firearms, 87 percent for alcohol, and
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79 percent for violence or tobacco” (cited in Skiba and Knesting 20). To further understand
the scope of zero tolerance school discipline policies and the ways they have become
codified in the law, this analysis will proceed by providing a brief overview of the policies
employed federally, across states, and in Chicago Public Schools (CPS).

E. Discipline Policy: A Legal Overview
Given the apparent difficulty in specifying a comprehensive definition of zero
tolerance, a brief history of policies that have come to define zero tolerance will help to
ground this analysis. The most notable law that set the tone for what zero tolerance has come
to mean, and the only one that exists at the federal level to codify zero tolerance, is the GunFree Schools Act (GFSA) of 1994. The GFSA was passed in the wake of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act (GFSZA) of 1990 being found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
Case, United States v. Lopez (Safra 637).7 Both of these federal laws also followed individual
school districts across the country adopting zero tolerance policies in late 1989.8 The GFSA,
passed under the Clinton administration, deviated in its specification of schools instead of
more loosely defined school zones, and the specific requirements of the act were as follows:
Each State receiving Federal funds under any title of this Act shall have in effect a
State law requiring local educational agencies to expel from school for a period of not
less than 1 year a student who is determined to have brought a firearm to a school, or
to have possessed a firearm at a school, under the jurisdiction of local educational
agencies in that State, except that such State law shall allow the chief administering
officer of a local educational agency to modify such expulsion requirement for a

The GFSZA, passed under the Bush administration, made it a federal offense “for any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone”
(Cornell University Law School), but it was found unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the
Congress’s Commerce Clause power (Safra 637).
8
For example, during this year, “school districts in Orange County, California, and Louisville, Kentucky,
promulgated zero tolerance policies that called for expulsion for possession of drugs or participation in gangrelated activity” (Skiba and Peterson 373). The specifics of these policies were not consistent across states.
7
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student on a case-by-case basis if such modification is in writing. (US Department of
Education)9
Though this initial wording of the bill clearly specified firearms as the primary source of
concern, the bill has since been amended to include any instrument that could be used as a
weapon as of concern. This broader definition of what a “dangerous weapon” entails, in
combination with the relatively limited power students have in contesting behavioral
disputes, has resulted in concern over the potential lack of due process available to students,
especially as the punishments associated with misconduct have escalated. Furthermore, the
degree of due process afforded to students varies on a state-by-state basis, based on statebased court cases: “Some [states] provide formal due process, such as a hearing with the right
to cross-examine witnesses. Others provide for no due process at all” (Cerrone 164). The lack
of specificity of this law largely contributes to the difficulty in nailing down a consistent
definition of zero tolerance, because zero tolerance can mean vastly different things within
different states, school districts, and even schools.
Given the range of zero tolerance policies and legal cases between states, it is worth
highlighting some of the most prominent of such state-specific examples. To get a sense of
the scope of zero tolerance policies, Skiba and Knesting find that, “at least one component of
a zero-tolerance approach is currently [as of 2001] in place in over 80 percent of the nation’s
schools” (18). Furthermore, according to the University of Chicago Consortium on School
Research, “over two million middle and high school students are suspended at least once
during the school year. Nationally, suspension rates for high school students increased from 8
percent in 1875 to 11 percent in 2010” (7). There is a self-perpetuating nature to this increase
in suspensions and expulsions. Inherent in the logic of zero tolerance is that each act of
The inclusion of “case-by-case basis” in the language of the act was primarily included as a means to respect
the legal requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (Stader 62).
9
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violence is capable of providing the fear necessary to increase state-sanctioned violence.
Within the specific history of zero tolerance policies in the US education system, there are
several key events in the American legal and political history that are is critical to be aware
of:
1960s-1970s: The aging in of the baby-boom generation into K-12 schools led to a
large growth in the number of students in school, at the same time when
political unrest was growing around civil rights issues and the Vietnam War
(Insley 1044). The result was that “school systems began to frequently use
out-of-school suspensions and expulsions as a way to remove disruptive
students from school” (1044-1045).
1970s: Nine students “instituted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Columbus
Board of Education and various administrators of the Columbus, Ohio, Public
School System” on the grounds that they had not received a hearing before
being suspended for up to ten days (Cerrone 139). The state court ultimately
found that the students had a property interest in attending school that
necessitated their rights for due process (140).
1975: In the case Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that there are
minimum due process requirements for short-term suspensions because
“suspension or expulsion deprives a student so completely of his or her
property interest to attend school” (139).
1990s: Leading up the introduction of the GFSA, schools responded to increased
fears about violence in American schools with “increased preventative
security measures such as police guards, metal detector, and locker searches”
(Insley 1045).
1994: Federal Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994
1999: Even after the introduction of the GFSA, some states continued to resist zerotolerance policies at the level of court proceedings. For example, in the 1999
case, Lyons v. Penn Hills School District, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court did not uphold the decision of a school “to expel a seventh grader for
filing his nails with a small pen-knife because the school refused to allow
discretionary review of their decision by the school board and superintendent”
(1054).
Though this is certainly not a complete political or legal history of zero tolerance, it helps to
provide some additional context for the rise of zero tolerance policies. While there has been
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legal resistance to individual instances of zero tolerance, there has yet to be any federal ruling
to clarify the due process concerns for the GFSA.

F. Focusing in on Chicago Public Schools (CPS)
Given the scope of zero tolerance laws across states and schools, this analysis will
focus in on the case of Chicago Public Schools (CPS). With over 600 schools that serve
approximately 400,000 children annually, CPS acts as the third largest school district in the
United States (CPS “CPS Stats and Facts”). Accordingly, CPS serves as a strong
representative case of the larger culture of zero tolerance nationally for a number of reasons.
At the level of demographic composition, CPS includes a high density of several of the most
critical groups that are typically focused on in school discipline behavior research. Racially,
CPS is composed of 37.7% “African American” students, 46.5% “Hispanic” students, and
9.9% “White” students (CPS).10 Additionally, 80.22% of students are considered to be
“Economically Disadvantaged,”11 17.17% of students are classified as “English Language
Learners (ELL),” and 13.66% of the students have IEPs (i.e. Individualized Education
Program’s individualized learning plans) (CPS). As an urban school district with a high
poverty rate and many of the most critical risk factors for misconduct in school, Chicago
serves as a relevant case study for how zero tolerance policies affect educational outcomes in
one of the nation’s more strained school districts.

For the purpose of consistency, I use the phrase “Black,” instead of “African American,” and “Latino,”
instead of “Hispanic” throughout the rest of this work. There is a lot more that can be said about the choice to
use each phrase over the other; however, for the purposes of this thesis, I commit to the usage of each phrase,
largely for consistency’s sake.
11
“Economically disadvantaged” is a term of art in the CPS data sets that refers to students from “families
whose income is within 185 percent of the federal poverty line (Chicago Public Schools “School Data”).
10
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CPS also serves as a strong case study because it has undergone several key policy
shifts away from zero tolerance policies. Three key policy changes in particular are often
understood as being attempts to shift away from the growing zero tolerance culture that CPS
has cultivated: the Culture of Calm Initiative of 2009-10 and 2010-11, the changes that the
CPS Student Code of Conduct underwent in 2012-13 and the Suspensions and Expulsions
Reduction Plan (SERP) of 2013-14 (Stevens et al. 8) Each of these policies, and their
relevance to this particular analysis, will be examined further in depth in Chapter 3, prior to
working through an empirical framework.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

Prior to analyzing the effects of zero tolerance policies on educational outcomes using
the data available from Chicago Public Schools (CPS), it is necessary to first review the
existing literature on both sides. The theories presented by existing literature—both at a
national level, and specific to CPS—help provide a foundation for understanding the various
causal channels that may influence the effects of these policies on educational outcomes. The
primary research question of this analysis is: What are the effects of zero tolerance policies
on educational outcomes? Therefore, this section will begin with a review of what existing
literature has identified as the most critical determinants of educational outcomes and will
then proceed by summarizing the “big picture” arguments about how zero tolerance policies
affect educational outcomes. The educational outcome of primary interest for the purpose of
this study is dropout rates, as this is the proxy for outcomes that will be employed in the
forthcoming analysis. The review of determinants will serve as a basis for the econometric
model build in Chapter 4, and these causal stories will be used to help break down the
findings in the analysis that follows.

A. Determinants of Educational Outcomes
Race/Racial Segregation of School
One of the most reviewed factors of educational outcomes in existing literature is
race, because it is associated with some of the most pronounced inequalities in educational
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outcomes. In 2001, the US high school completion rates12 ranged from 65.7 percent for
Latina/o students, to 85.6 percent for Black students, 91.8 percent for White students, and
96.1 percent for Asians/Pacific Islanders (Kaufman and Chapman 19).13 However, these
statistics only begin to describe the full story. There is evidence that the actual differences in
learning between races begin very early within the educational pipeline:
At four years of age, between 18.8% and 28.3% of Black, Latino, and American
Indian children—compared to between 36.8% and 49.4% of White and Asian
children—are proficient in letter recognition (Aud et al., 2011). (American
Psychological Association 14)
These early inequalities follow students of color—and particularly, African American,
Latino, Native American, and certain Asian American subgroups—throughout the education
pipeline, as students from these groups have poorer educational outcomes through the twelfth
grade (on average) “and are concomitantly underrepresented in high school graduation rates,
placement in gifted and talented programs, and admission rates to postsecondary education,
when compared to their White and other Asian American peer” (American Psychological
Association 14). However, to look at the effect of race in isolation from other critical factors
intimately associated with race today, such as socio-economic status, welfare policies,
migration status, language status, etc. and to suggest that there is something intrinsic about
this variance in educational achievement by race, would be to tread dangerously close to
racist and classist cultural deficiency models of education.14 Therefore, this review will not

According to Kaufman and Chapman, “Status completion rates represent the percentage of 18- through 24year-olds who are not enrolled in school and have not completed high school by earning a diploma or obtaining
a high school equivalency certificate,” so the completion rate represents the inverse of that (19).
13
This data is based on information collected through the Census Bureau’s Current Population Surveys from
1972 to 2001, being cited by Kaufman and Chapman (19).
14
The cultural deficit model, or “deficit model” ‘is the perspective that minority group members are different
because their culture is deficient in important ways from the dominant majority group” (Salkind). This model is
often applied to the US education system as a means of suggesting that certain cultures value education and
therefore work harder, while others don’t, and that accounts for any differences in educational outcomes
12
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focus too heavily on the effects of race alone, but will instead continue to explore race
through the lens of segregation and race’s interactive effects with other determinants of
educational outcomes.
A more specified channel of influence—particularly given school-level data—is
racial segregation/the relative density of particular racial groups. One of my key findings in
my final Applied Econometrics paper on suspension rates (rather than educational
outcomes), “Examining the Effects of Race on Suspension Rates between ‘Low’ and ‘High’
Quality Chicago Public Schools” was that, when looking at school-level data for a school
district as segregated as CPS, examining the effects of a school’s race by percentage values
alone may not be too helpful at capturing the larger dynamics. Rather, my findings are
consistent with the logic behind Brown v. Board of Education and that “there [may be] some
particular effect of racial composition/diversity, rather than race alone, that matters in the
case of suspension rates” (Kaul 20). The logic behind this suggestion is that the marginal
effects of a school having one percentage more Black students might be radically different
than the effects of that school being more segregated and/or having a Black majority
compose its student body. And, given that “black and Hispanic adolescents [are]
approximately 3 times and 2.5 times more likely than the average student to attend a highly
segregated school,” racial segregation disproportionately affects students differently by race.
This is evidenced by findings that “desegregation plans of the 1970’s reduced high school
dropout rates of blacks by two to three percentage points during this decade. No significant
change is observed among whites” (Guryan 919). According to a 2015 analysis presented by
Stanford’s Center for Education Policy Analysis (CEPA), the particular mechanism by which

between the groups. The danger here lies in displacing guilt on structural inequality to the supposed complete
autonomy of marginalized groups caught within larger systems of power.

Kaul 28
racial segregation matters is exposure to other poor classmates, so reducing the race-based
differences in this exposure15 might “lead to meaningful reductions in racial achievement
gaps” (Reardon 23).16 Racial composition has also been found to have particular teacherlevel effects on the quality of education provided in majority-Black or Latino schools:
Approximately 2 out of every 3 teachers in majority White schools are certified in
their assignment subjects, whereas only 1 out of 2 teachers were certified in schools
in which either the proportion of African Americans or Latinos was greater that 50%
of the population. (American Psychological Association 17)
In addition to these effects, racial segregation can have broader implications on school
climate, such as “lower-between group understanding and empathy and increased prejudice,”
“damage[d] minority students’ self-concept,” and “degrade[d] students’ ability to collaborate
in diverse settings” (Reardon 22). In the context of school discipline, all of these factors that
influence the cohesion of the school as a community are important to be aware of, because
they may serve as indicators of discipline practices as well. There is literature that suggests,
“black students benefit from having black peer networks at school” such that it is beneficial
for them to have black peers, but not necessarily be placed within black-majority schools
(Palardy et al. 10). All of this is to suggest that looking at race alone might be less indicative
than racial composition/segregation, particularly when it comes to school-level data. And,
given the close relationship between race (and racially segregated schools, in particular) and
socioeconomic status (and school funding), racial segregation cannot be understood as
separate from the segregation of students by socioeconomic status because the effects of both

This language of “exposure” makes this read as though “poor classmates” contaminate their schools. I do not
intend to affirm this particular framing of these dynamics, as I feel this linguistic framing of the issue of SES
and race can be reproduced dangerously so as to justify the inferiority of poor students of color.
16
Other studies have also found that desegregation can have positive effects on educational outcomes by race.
For example, in Jonathan Guryna’s 2003 paper, “Desegregation and Black Dropout Rates,” he found: “Analysis
of data from the 1970 and 1980 censuses suggests that desegregation plans of the 1970’s reduced the high
school dropout rates of blacks by two to three percentage points during this decade. Desegregation plans can
account for about half of the decline in dropout rates of blacks between 1970 and 1980” (2).
15
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often end up being one and the same. Segregation—and especially racial segregation, is
therefore perhaps best understood as having a multiplier effect on all of the other variables: in
highly racially segregated schools, it is likely for the effects of socioeconomic status,
language status, etc. to be more pronounced, because those schools are more likely to be
highly segregated along class and language lines as well.

Socioeconomic Status (SES)
Accordingly, one of the channels of influence that is perhaps an even larger driving
force than race is socioeconomic status (or, SES):
[…] recent research suggests that socioeconomic achievement gaps are now larger
than racial achievement gaps and that socioeconomic segregation has a stronger
detrimental impact on student learning and attainment (high school graduation and
college enrollment) than does racial segregation (Palardy, 2013; Reardon, 2011;
Rumberger & Palardy, 2005a).” (Palardy et al.3).
Not surprisingly, divisions over who is most impacted by poverty are also largely drawn on
racial lines: “While 10.1% and 11.1% of the White and Asian are living in poverty, 27.1%,
34.1%, and 32.7% of Latino, Black, and American Indian children are living in poverty
(NAEP, 2010)” (American Psychological Association 17). The mechanisms of influence for
SES on educational outcomes are not, however, only at the student level, but are largely tied
to school funding. According to a 2002 review by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities:
A comprehensive review of over 60 statistical analyses that examine the link between
school inputs, such as funding levels and student poverty rates, and school outcomes,
such as test scores and graduation rates, indicates that school funding and student
performance are strongly related. (Carey 1)
Another causal story that explains part of SES’s effects on educational outcomes is also the
effect of SES on the internal organizational capacities of the school: “For example,
McDonough (1997) found that high socioeconomic composition schools tend to have an
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organizational habitus that promotes attendance at selective 4-year colleges above and
beyond that predicted by the academic and family backgrounds of the students” (cited in
Palardy et al. 4). There are also observed differences on the differences in discipline between
low and high SES schools that may mediate the effects on educational outcomes:
For example, schools serving low SES students tend to put a greater emphasis on
obedience to authority and conforming to rules and procedures, whereas schools
serving middle- and high SES students put a greater emphasis on student initiative
and creativity, whereby promoting differential behavioral expectations that may have
long-term consequences on future educational and career success prospects (Bowles
& Gintis, 1976; Farkas, 2003). (Palardy et al. 5)
These differences in the fundamental school culture begin to help explain the harshness of
schools like Perspectives, where a food fight might become labeled as criminal behavior.
Because of the strong connection between SES and race, having lower-SES students be
focused on obedience to authority often translates to cultures of obedience being stressed
within working class, communities of color that are themselves coded as “deviant.” This
process of either placing the emphasis within school culture on obedience or student
initiative/creativity, therefore, may have larger implications on which communities are
understood to be a threat to “order” and which communities moderate that “order.”

English (Language) Learner (EL/ELL) Status
Another channel of influence that is intricately tied with race is a student’s English
Learner Status (EL status). An EL student is a student whose primary language is not English
and whose schools therefore often enroll them in remedial English classes. The language
status of students is understood as a critical factor across the literature on educational
inequality and it is of particular importance to CPS, given that “CPS has one of the largest
ELL student populations of any district in the country” (Gwynne et al. 9). Like the other
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channels of influence, EL/L status is highly associated with race and class factors; for
example, 67 percent of ELLs in CPS high schools, as of the 2004-2005 school year, were
Latino (10). Existing literature on EL status suggests that school-level effects account for the
majority of the gap between EL students and their “long-term proficient” peers:
Because new ELLs were more likely to attend academically weaker schools, they
graduated at lower rates than long-term proficient students” and, when controlling for
differences in school quality, the gap between the graduation rates of ELLs and their
peers drops from 40 percent to 4 percent difference. (45)
There are, of course, relevant difference even within the group of students classified as EL/L
between the groups considered “Long-Term ELL Students”17 and those who are classified as
“New ELLs”18 (50). While Long-Term ELL students “had the worst course performance of
any group [of ELL students],”19 those who were New ELLs “did as well as long-term
proficient students in their classes” (50). The CPS public data files unfortunately do not
distinguish between these groups in what they label as “Bilingual” (their label for “EL”)
students, so this analysis will be unable to disaggregate by sub-groups to get a better
understanding of the nuances of these differences. Therefore, it is critical to look more
closely at the dynamics that account for the differing effects within the EL sub-group—
perhaps the most critical of which being their migration status.

These students are classified as those who were “[…] identified as ELLs in the elementary grades and still
had not achieved proficiency by ninth grade” (Gwynne et al. 50).
18
These students are those “[…] who were new to CPS in the middle grades or high school and entered ninth
grade as ELLs” (50).
19
Gwynne et al. go so far as to quantify the particular effects of being a Long-Term ELL student in CPS, on
average: “On average, Hispanic long-term ELLs failed nearly three classes; had a C- GPA; and missed an
average of 18 days, or 3.5 weeks, of school during their first year of high school. […] After taking into account
differences in attendance, long-term ELLs earned similar grades and failed the same number of classes as new
ELLs; their GPAs and course failures were still significantly worse than long-term proficient students and
students who were never ELLs, but the differences were small” (50).
17
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Migration Status
The existing literature on migration status indicates that there are differing effects on
education outcomes, in large part due to whether a student is first-, second-, or thirdgeneration, and due to other factors associated with migration status (like SES and race).
According to a 2-year study that incorporated data from both National Educational
Longitudinal Study (NELS) and High School and Beyond (HSB), for example, “The best
predictors of the trajectory of achievement are not those that are based on nativity per se, but
those that reflect the social environment experienced in the United States (i.e. ethnicity and
family’s socioeconomic status)” (Glick and White 759). This is largely associated with
findings that “compared with natives, immigrants (on average) exhibit lower levels of school
attainment, lower personal income, higher levels of poverty, and so on” (759). Another study
that also incorporated the NELS data set found that “parental immigrant status is more
influential than the immigrant status of youth in determining scholastic performance” (Kao
and Tienda 16). According to the results of that same study, there is “little difference
between the educational performance of first and second generation youth. Yet, both groups
tend to outperform their third generation or higher counterparts on various scholastic
outcomes” (16). There are, not surprisingly, racial differences here as well: “[The]
immigration status of youth and parents accounts for much more of the variation in
educational outcomes among Asian students than other minority or white students” (16).
Despite these differences, though, the differences in “scholastic performance” between Asian
students and non-Latino, white students disappears when the Asian-American students are
third generation or higher (17). This is all to suggest that the effects of migration status (in
terms of generation), one’s race and/or country of origin, EL status (and likely the language,
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too), and SES, all affect educational outcomes in ways that feed off of and depend on each
other. This may pose a challenge in terms of measuring the individual effects of each given
variable. Unfortunately, data on migration status is not available in the data set used for this
analysis; however, given the clear relatedness between migration status and race and EL
status, there are other variables available in the data set that are able to catch at least some of
these effects in the regressions.

Disability Status
Finally, existing literature also suggests there to be a relevant gap in educational
outcomes between students classified as “special education” and those who are not. Today,
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) protects students with disabilities
ranging from speech impediments, to emotional disturbances, to learning disabilities, and
more (Pasternack 3). While the literature concludes that students with disabilities
underperform their peers, much of the reason why this is the case is because of inadequate
resources to best support students with disabilities, and not because these students are
somehow incapable of the same level of academic performance. In terms of the effect of
disabilities on education outcomes, the findings suggest that 35.1 percent of students with a
disability are at or above state proficiency levels in math and 36.4 of students with a
disability are performing at or above state proficiency levels in Reading (13-14). Even this
channel of influence is critically tied to race:
First, African American students are disproportionately referred to and placed in the
high-incidence special education categories of mental retardation, emotional or
behavioral disorders, and learning disabilities (Zhang & Katsiyannis, 2002). Second,
once labeled as having disabilities and placed in special education, African American
students make achievement gains and exit special education at rates considerably
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lower than those of White students identified as having disabilities (U.S. Department
of Education, 2004). (Blanchett 24)
Therefore, some of the aforementioned race effects become compounded when they intersect
with students having disabilities. Part of this is because of the ways that “deviancy” and/or
“disorder” as oppositional to the dominant culture: “Educators tend to see Whiteness as the
norm and consequently the academic skills, behavior, and social skills of African American
and other students of color are constantly compared with those of their White peers” (27).
These constructions of what is considered to be “deviant” are helpful in predicting which
students are most likely to make it through the US educational pipeline, and are also critical
in understanding the way that discipline policies police behavior. In other words, there is
nothing inherent or biological about a student’s race, SES, migration status, etc. that makes
them less intelligent or able or perform well academically. It is the larger institutional forces
in society dictating who can and cannot be included within the dominant culture that affect
students of marginalized communities’ ability to perform at the same academic level as their
peers and not be pushed out of the system.
This survey of channels of influence is not exhaustive, as there are other relevant
factors that existing research suggest may affect a student’s educational outcomes. For
example, one of the most common variables that was omitted from this analysis was gender.
It was omitted because the effects variable, perhaps more than others, is much more difficult
to capture at the school-level of analysis that this work operates at. The primary literature that
exists around gender and educational outcomes is split between the individual-level effects of
being some gender rather than another and the effects of single-gender education models at
the school-level. Relatedly, a student’s sexuality—especially as it relates to the dominant
culture of their school and/or community may also impact their educational outcomes. This

Kaul 35
data, however, is much more difficult to acquire for important privacy reasons, and it is
therefore also more challenging to understand in the context of school-level data. All of this
is to say that this literature review provides a survey of the most important channels of
analysis when approaching school-level data, but it certainty does not include enough
channels of influence to be a truly comprehensive model. To compensate for this, larger
narrative arguments explaining the mechanisms by which zero tolerance policies may affect
educational outcomes will be explored after reviewing two potential confounding variables in
this analysis.

B. Confounding Variables
High-Stakes Testing Schedules20
The data available on educational outcomes is biased because of the particular
dynamics of schools’ moderation of behavior policies in the wake of high-stakes tests. David
Figlio studied the effects of high-stakes testing on suspension rates on schools and—after
controlling for the factors of a student being a first-time versus repeat offender, and
identifying a set of month-of-year dummy variables—he found that “schools respond to highstakes testing by selectively disciplining their students” (21). The reason for this is that
schools are incentivized to optimize for highest aggregate test scores, and so they often try to
remove low-performing students from schools during testing periods and raise their average
scores. This is a critical variable to consider when looking at the months during which data
This section of writing on “High-Stakes testing Schedules” is taken directly (with minor changes) from my
final paper for Professor Cutter’s Applied Econometrics class in Fall 2016. That paper, titled “Examining the
Effects of Race on Suspension Rates between ‘Low’ and ‘High’ Quality Chicago Public Schools” worked with
CPS data from the 2014-2015 school year to look specifically at the effects of School Quality—as quantified by
CPS’s SQRP ratings—on race’s effects on suspension rates. That analysis serves as a sort of groundwork for
this present analysis because the SQRP ratings are essentially a proxy for educational outcomes, as they are
calculated using a series of test scores and factors such as the drop-out rate.
20
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regarding suspension rates was collected, as these the amount of disciplinary punishment
may unnaturally spike during testing period, according to Figlio’s work, and perhaps skew
the data. Though this measure is interesting to consider and is certainly worth further
investigation, the data that this paper utilizes is yearly and does not include the timeline of
these tests. Therefore, capturing the particular seasonal effects of testing schedules on
suspension rates is difficult; however, this paper controls for some of these effects by only
studying schools in the same district (with presumably more or less the same high-stakes
testing schedule). This confounding variable has the potential to affect the documented
educational outcomes in ways that are not feasible to fully control in the context of this
study, however, given the limitations of the yearly, school-level panel data.

Chicago-Specific Policy Changes
In addition to all of the determinants discussed above, there are also several key
changes in the way CPS policy measures “educational outcomes” to be aware of because
they must be controlled as confounding variables to this analysis. The measures of
“educational outcomes” in the context of the econometric analysis that follows are dropout
rate and freshman on-track rate—both measures that depend on district-defined standards for
what is required to meet each of those outcomes. Therefore, the measures themselves are in
that sense not static. There are a few ways in which such level of policy change can impact
the factor of dropout rate in particular. For one, the measure of dropout rate is fundamentally
difficult to capture because “[i]t is often difficult for schools to determine what happened to
their students who are no longer attending classes and to accurately record their reasons for
leaving” (Allensworth et al. 83). This is a problem, given that there is existing evidence that
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suggests that “students coded as transfer students have been increasingly lower achieving that
students who remain in CPS to be counted in the graduation rates” (83). Therefore, there are
challenges to the accuracy of record keeping that are not necessarily constant over time.
Existing research also suggests the possibility that “schools [have] lowered their standards to
get more students to graduate, encouraging teachers to pass students in their classes despite
weak performance” (29). There is reason to believe, however, that CPS schools have not
lowered their standards, but instead CPS “high schools […] [might be] enrolling betterqualified students, or students from more affluent neighborhoods” (34). None of this is to
suggest that policy changes have a causal relationship to actual educational outcomes, but
rather there may be inconsistencies in the ways that those educational outcomes are
measured. Therefore, it is important to control for school fixed-effects and include a time
trend in the econometric analysis, so as to control for these confounding variables as best as
is possible.
While the primary channels of influence between zero tolerance discipline policies
and educational outcomes have been surveyed, there is more to be said explaining the larger
systems at play that moderate these channels of influence. Therefore, the following two
sections will therefore provide further context by including the primary arguments made in
the existing literature for and against zero tolerance policies (in relation to education
outcomes, specifically). These “bigger picture” arguments synthesize the channels of
influence by providing broader narratives under which to understand these determinants.
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C. Big Picture Arguments for Zero Tolerance
Removing the “Bad Apples”
At the heart of the dualist theory of punitive philosophy lies an understanding of a
particular sort of “disorder” as deviant from, and therefore a threat to, the norm of how a
classroom ought to operate. Within the context of “moral panic” rhetoric over the threat of
school violence and the corresponding sense of risk aversion articulated alongside the
construction of such threat, any single student can challenge the fragility of this “order.”
Therefore, because of this understanding of such order/disorder as dualistically static, there is
little room for rehabilitation or reconciliation, and students must instead be punished on the
first strike. This logic is central to several national charter networks that have gained national
attention for their educational outcomes, such as the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP),
Success Academy, and Uncommon Schools (Rizga). Charter schools such as these provide
an interesting example of this logic because many of them are hugely focused on optimizing
for test scores (and other similar measures of educational outcomes), so their adoption of
zero tolerance policies may provide an interesting story of school discipline policy that fits
into the narrative of this analysis. One example of this phenomenon is that of a charter school
in Boston:
A famous example of “no excuses” charter school is the Roxbury Preparatory Charter
School near Boston that was founded by Secretary of Education John King Jr. in
1999. Roxbury Prep became the highest-performing urban public school in
Massachusetts, according to NPR. It is these high test scores—more than any other
measure—that charter school advocates cite as a strong argument for replacing
traditional schools” (Rizga).
Though it is not possible to draw a causal story from this information alone, it is important to
note also that Roxbury Prep had the highest suspension rate of any charter school in
Massachusetts that year, with “40 percent of all students and 58 percent of its students
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[being] suspended in 2014” (Rizga).21 In such schools, teachers and administrators are often
enforcing punishment for a lot more than carrying weapons. A student in the KIPP network
notes that, because the school operates using a point system that determines students’
abilities to do things like attend field trips and attend their graduation ceremony, they are
capable of being informally “punished” (i.e. losing points) for infractions as minor as not
tucking in one’s shirt or not making eye contact with one’s teacher (Rizga). There is no
large-scale analysis to draw casual conclusions about the relationship between charter
schools’ zero tolerance policies and their educational outcomes, but such schools embody the
logic of one of the primary arguments in support of zero tolerance in schools. It is necessary
to contextualize this logic in what researchers have come to refer to as the “push-out
phenomenon”—the tendency of schools to suspend a large number of students prior to a
high-stakes test that was mentioned as a confounding variable in this study (Simson 513).
This is concerning if one holds a view of proportional punishment and due process, and also
illuminates the reality that schools eliminating the “bad apples” may not change the
educational culture of the school at all, but simply artificially skew data.

“Broken Windows Theory:” Punishment as Deterrent
More central to theories of punishment and zero tolerance is the “broken windows
theory”—a model of policing that originated in the early 1980s22 and focused on the effect of
perceived disorder on crime rates. At its core, this model argues that disorder (as manifested
in something like a broken window in a neighborhood) is a key determinant of future crime,
so the primary role of the police becomes to maintain order and “reinforce the informal
21

This compares to rates of 10 percent and 18 percent, respectively, at a national level in 2011-12 (Rizga).
More specifically, this model of policing first appeared in 1982 in Wilson and Kelling’s article in the
Atlantic, “Broken Windows: The police and neighborhood safety” (Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy).
22
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control mechanisms of the community itself” (Wilson and Kelling). Building on the work of
the prominent psychologist, Philip Zimbardo, the theorists that pioneered this ideology
focused on the dynamics of crime and order of communities over just individuals
Just as physicians now recognize the importance of fostering health rather than
simply treating illness, so the police—and the rest of us—ought to recognize the
importance of maintaining, intact, communities without broken windows. (Wilson
and Kelling)
This logic of policing through symbolic control offers another potential argument in support
of zero tolerance’s effect on educational outcomes. The crux of this argument is that discrete
symbols of disorder can have significant ramifications on the functioning of the system as a
whole. This argument for zero tolerance in school discipline is therefore that allowing for
even the smallest exposures of disorder in the system has broader effects on school order, and
potentially learning outcomes. By physically removing students from the learning
environment of other students, however, the students who are not “misbehaving” will be
better able to focus on learning the material in the classroom and will not get distracted by
other students. They are also themselves less likely to commit behavioral infractions,
according to this logic, but zero tolerance policies enforce strict control over the order of the
school system.

D. Big Picture Arguments Against Zero Tolerance
Quantitative Data-Driven Accounts
The consensus of the data-driven, statistical analyses on the effects of zero tolerance
on educational outcomes and continued behavioral infractions overwhelmingly is that zero
tolerance policies are ineffective. Given that this literature employs a similar methodological
approach as will be used in the following chapter of this paper, it is helpful to survey the
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particulars of some of the existing regression analyses. In perhaps one of the most extensive
studies on the subject, Myers et al. performed a regression analysis on the relationship
between misbehavior in school and academic performance, using panel data from about
19,000 high school sophomores in over 1,100 schools in 1980 (21). Their analysis concluded
that, for students who remained in high school for at least two years after their sophomore
year, “those who report low grade point averages experience greater increases in misbehavior
between the base-year survey than those who report high grade point averages” (Ibid. 30).
Critical to note here is that, though this study is concerned with the same variables as this
analysis of zero tolerance, it looks at the effect of educational outcomes on misbehavior (i.e.
the inverse of what this analysis looks at). Myers et al. is still worth looking at because its
large body of panel data is rare, and it is employed to reveal some relationship between
educational outcomes and behavioral infractions.
A more recent, existing piece of research that is more directly parallel to this analysis
is Linda Raffaele Mendez’s 2003 article “Predictors of Suspension and Negative School
Outcomes: A Longitudinal Investigation.” Her longitudinal study follows a cohort of Florida
students from their second grade year to their senior year of high school (projected to be
2002) to examine “students’ demographic characteristics—race, gender, socioeconomic
status, special education classification—and seeks to discover predictors of student
suspension rates, as well as the effect of suspension on students’ educational achievement
and graduation” (18). Her study focuses in particular on the effects of out-of-school
suspension (OSS) and finds that “frequent use of suspension has no measurable positive
deterrent or academic benefit to either the students who are suspended or to nonsuspended
students” (25). The study identifies schools’ lack of follow-up to suspensions with problem-
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solving procedures as one of the reasons strict discipline policies fail to address the root
causes of student misbehavior. More specifically in the context of educational outcomes, the
studies finds: “School suspension correlates significantly with a host of negative outcomes,
including students’ poor academic achievement, grade retention, delinquency, dropping out,
disaffection and alienation, and drug use” (26). The underlying reason why zero tolerance
policies have been empirically shown in this study to cause negative educational outcomes
for students is that others students from their classes, and even schools, take away their
chances away to be fully engaged in their coursework when they take out the “problem kids”
from the classroom.

Punishment as Stigmatization and Isolation
The argument that underlies the majority of opposition towards zero tolerance is that
zero tolerance comes with tremendous psychological costs that most often target the students
who are considered to be “at-risk” to begin with. The logic of zero tolerance is that an
individual who commits any behavioral infraction from a predetermined list will receive a
predetermined punishment because this sets up a predictable system of punishment that will
deter crime. This takes for granted, however, that all students who commit behavioral
infractions will respond well to the same form of punishment (or punishment at all for that
matter) and ignores the potential psychological costs. According to a 2014 report in the
UCLA Law Review, this sort of trauma can have longer-term effects on student and
community well being:
Excessive punishment not only impedes learning and general childhood development
but also subverts the relationship of students with, and their trust and their confidence
in, authority figures, which intensifies conflicts rather than mediating them.51
Furthermore, students who are suspended or expelled from school for a significant
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amount of time often have no access to alternative education or the alternative
education to which they have access is gravely deficient (Simson 516-17).
What this means is that the students who may already be in need of additional academic
support are literally pushed out of school with no resources to help them catch up to their
peers in the classroom. Given that the majority of out-of-school suspensions are used to
punish more trivial acts (such as disrespecting authority) that may be stemming from “family
problems, detachment from school, or learning disabilities,” suspensions can be
psychologically disorienting for students (Simson 515-516). Furthermore, the racial
dynamics present in many school discipline cases only further compound these effects on the
most vulnerable students. Standards of what is considered appropriate or inappropriate
behavior are necessarily value-laden:
[…] normative baselines represent the fact that the dominant societal group—
whites—will attach labels of appropriateness, even superiority, to its own customary
behaviors” in a way that uses school discipline to reproduce and reify racial
hierarchies. (Simson 550)
It is not all too surprising then that the Southern Poverty Law Center has found black
students to be five times as likely to be suspended, as compared to their white peers
(Brownstein). The factor of race in school discipline cannot be overstated and will be further
explored in the context of Chicago, specially through the more specified lens of racial
segregation, as was mentioned in the first section of the literature review. What is most
important to be aware of at this stage of the analysis is that zero tolerance policies can cause
psychological harm to already marginalized groups and reinforce systematic barriers for
those students’ access to the same experience and quality of education as their peers not as
directly affected by zero tolerance policies and racial politics.
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School-to-Prison Pipeline
One of the much broader effects of zero tolerance is that it affects the safety of entire
communities through what has become known as the “school-to-prison pipeline.” This
phenomenon refers to two related, but distinct phenomena:
[The “school-to-prison pipeline”] refer[s] to a journey through school that is
increasingly punitive and isolating for its travelers—many of whom will be placed in
restrictive special education programs, repeatedly suspended, held back a grade, and
banished to alternative, “outplacements” before finally dropping [out] or getting
“pushed out” of school altogether. The second half of the pipeline metaphor refers to
parallel shifts that have taken place in public attitudes and public policies regarding
juvenile misconduct over the past decade. Since 1992, 45 states have passed laws
making it easier to try juveniles as adults, 31 have stiffened sanctions against youths
for a variety of offenses and 47 loosened confidentiality provisions for juveniles.
(Wald and Losen 3)
The school-to-prison pipeline thrives on the increased focus on punishment and the expanded
police presence in schools that is made possible by zero tolerance policies. With the increase
in punishment for behavioral infractions at schools running parallel to the shift in the
criminal justice system at large trying juveniles as adults, there has developed a metaphorical
“pipeline” between schools and prisons. Furthermore, this phenomenon captures the nature
of the dualistic representations of children at its very heart: if students are either “good” or
“bad,” then what was previously understood as a necessity to respect the developmental
differences between minors and adults becomes superfluous within school discipline. The
question, for the purpose of this present analysis, then becomes: What is the effect of this
pipeline on educational outcomes? As it turns out, this growing proximity between schools
and prisons has particularly negative effects when it comes to educational outcomes, and not
just recidivism. When students become entangled within the court system, often because of
their school’s decision to have the police more involved in moderating student behavior,
“schools often refuse to accept students who are court-involved, leaving them without

Kaul 45
educational services for months at a time and increasing the likelihood that they will have
further run-ins with the law” (9). However, even when students are just suspended for long
periods of time (and not directly involved with the prison system), most schools lack re-entry
academic or counseling interventions to support these students and help them avoid dropping
out from school (10). Furthermore, there are numerous “collateral consequences” of felony
convictions in this pipeline, including, but not limited to: “voter disenfranchisement, denial
of Federal welfare, medical, housing or educational benefits, accelerated time-lines for loss
of parental rights and exclusion from any number of employment opportunities” (Heitzig 6).
Therefore, when zero tolerance policies become coupled with the mass incarceration of the
communities home to many of the students most affected by these same harsch discipline
practices, there is a particular sort of violence perpetuated that places full blame for poor
educational outcomes and “deviant” behavior on students who are trapped within a system
largely beyond any of their real control.
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Chapter 3
Introducing Chicago as a Case Study

In this chapter, the particular historical context of Chicago will be surveyed as a
means of better understanding the dynamics of education policy reform in the CPS district.
The first part of this analysis will trace three primary eras of school reform from 1988 to
2009 to set the groundwork for second part’s focus on key changes in CPS’s discipline
policy. After establishing these general and discipline-specific policy histories of CPS, the
third section will provide an empirical framework for the regressions that will be analyzed in
the following chapter.
I. Chicago’s Context
The current school discipline policies in Chicago Public Schools (CPS) grew out of
the particular history of school reform in Chicago. In a September 2011 report put out by the
Consortium on Chicago School Research (CCSR), et al. proposes three distinct eras in
Chicago school reform: Decentralization, Accountability, and Diversification (6-10). This
framing of CPS provides a helpful way of distinguishing the differing district leadership and
central reform policies of each era. Analyzing the dynamics of school discipline in CPS
would be haphazard without contextualizing that history within the larger ideological shifts
that have taken place in CPS, so it is critical to further explore the specifics of each of these
eras.
The era of Decentralization—lasting from 1988 to 1995—began with the passage of
the Chicago School Reform Act of 1988 (9-10). The passage of this act represented a shift of
power away from the central office to local schools through its establishment of Local School
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Councils, (LSCs)—local governing bodies composed of the school principal, representatives
of the faculty, parents, and community members (9).23 Councils had a large amount of
power, given that they were responsible for hiring the principal, allocating financial
resources, and making curriculum-related decisions. During this era, reading scores stayed
relatively stagnant and math scores made relative increases; however, the state was not
satisfied with the academic performance of CPS by the end of this era (25-27).
The following era of Accountability—beginning in 1996 and lasting through 2001—
brought back control to the mayor of Chicago to manage the school system (9-10). While the
local and state government maintained a more “hands off” approach to schools in the
previous era, this era was the opposite. Perhaps most characteristic of this era was the fact
that the former budget director, Paul Vallas, assumed the newly instated position of CEO, an
unprecedented role within CPS (9). There were a number of accountability measures
designed to improve student educational achievement introduced, such as test-based
promotional requirements based on standardized test performance, increased probation and
interventions for low-scoring students, the occasional firing of principals for low test scores,
and other measures of the sort (9). This era of Chicago school reform, therefore, reflected the
larger shifts occurring in the US educational landscape towards increased test-based
accountability. By the end of this era, No Child Left Behind had been introduced federally,
expanding “state-mandated standardized testing as means of assessing school performance”
(Alcocer).
The Diversification era was the final era accounted for in Luppescu et al.’s analysis
and covers the time span of 2002 to 2009. The key change that transitioned CPS into this era

23

More specifically, as of August 2012, each LSC is composed of 6 parents, 2 community members, 2 teachers,
1 non-teaching staff member, 1 principal, and 1 student from a high-school (CPS “CPS Stats and Facts”).
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was the resignation of Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan’s assumption of his position as CEO.
Duncan built on the shift towards accountability and took it one step further by
experimenting heavily with school type:
The Duncan administration was characterized by opening many new charter and
contract schools, focusing on transforming high schools, closing poorly performing
schools, instituting new instructional programs, and working to improve professional
development. […] From 2001 to 2009, Chicago saw 155 new schools open and 82
schools close (10).
The shift towards diversifying schools relied heavily on the use of data, and it was during this
period that the city came up with mechanisms to measure student’s progress in ninth grade
and college outcomes (10). This era also coincided with the introduction of No Child Left
Behind (NCLB) at the federal level, and preceded Duncan leaving CPS to assume the
position of the US Secretary of Education (10). Duncan’s background in CPS, in many ways,
drew more national attention to the failures and successes of CPS.
This rise of high-stakes testing is critical in contextualizing the rise of zero
tolerance—both at a federal level and in the case of CPS—because both phenomena grew
from the same dualistic understandings of youth. In a 2012 report, the Chicago Teachers
Union argues: “in most CPS schools, particularly struggling ones, teachers meetings are
dominated by looking at data, analyzing data and talking about how to ‘improve (data)
outcomes,’ when it should also be a time for professional collaboration and/or learning” (14).
Teachers are also increasingly placed on the receiving end of this data collection, as their
students’ test scores are the primary determinant of their “effectiveness” (14). Given the
existing literature that finds that “schools respond to high-stakes testing by selectively
disciplining their students,” it is not difficult to understand the increased pressure a
standardized testing-dominated regime may have within the classroom (Figlio 21). There is a
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way in which zero-tolerance school discipline and high-stakes become mutually-reinforcing:
districts that have the poorest test results are under the most pressure to perform higher,
which often is reflected in increasingly punitive measures and “zero tolerance becomes the
tool used to address the inevitable student backlash from the daily grind of filling in testbooklet bubbles and being subjected to a narrowed, lackluster curriculum” (Advancement
Project 28). It is not too surprising then that, by the third era of Chicago school reform in the
2009-2010 school year, suspensions were at their peak, with approximately one in every four
high school students receiving an out-of-school (OSS) suspension (Stevens et al. 1). In fact,
the zero tolerance approach to school discipline was championed under Arne Duncan: during
his six years of leadership, the number of OSS suspensions district-wide quadrupled
(Advancement Project 5).
The CPS school district today therefore serves as a useful case study of the national
story of zero tolerance because it isolates the national shifts that occurred in education
politics and policy within a more localized context. As the third largest school district in the
US, its size and diversity reflect the conditions existing literature suggests are breeding
grounds for harsh school discipline policies. CPS today includes 652 schools, with 480
elementary schools and 172 high schools (CPS “CPS Stats and Facts”). Because of the
literature focus on the effects of zero tolerance at the high school-level, this analysis will only
focus on the data from these high schools. Of these schools, 516 of them are district-run, 125
of them are charter, 9 are contract, and 2 are SAFE schools (CPS). In terms of the student
body, there are 381,349 students in the district, as of 2016-2017 school year’s 20th Day
Enrollment measures (CPS). Of these students, there are 109,053 students at the high school
level (this analysis’s focus) (CPS). 80.22 percent of the total CPS student body is considered
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to be “Economically Disadvantaged,” 17.17 percent are considered to be English Language
Learners (ELL), and 13.66 percent of the students have an IEP (CPS). These demographics
are not consistent between schools, or over years, though, as will be further explored in the
Data Analysis section of Chapter 4. In terms of the racial composition of the student body,
the largest group is Latinos at 46.5 percent, followed by Blacks at 37.7 percent, and Whites at
9.9 percent (CPS). These racial demographics do not map onto the racial breakdowns of
teachers, as is often the case with US schools, particularly in schools with larger percentages
of students of color. More specifically, White teachers comprise the largest racial
demographic at 50.1 percent, followed by Black staff at 22.2 percent, and Latino staff at 20.4
percent (CPS). Interestingly, the largest racial group composing principals in CPS are Black
principals at 43.1 percent, followed by White principals at 36.3 percent, and Latino principals
at 15.5 percent (CPS). The differences in these racial demographics between students,
principals, and teachers are important to be aware of in the context of school discipline, given
that they may affect what sorts of behavior that school comes to define as “deviant” in light
of potentially varying cultural and/or racially coded expectations of behavior.

II. Chicago Public School Policy Changes
Even prior to CPS reached its peak suspensions during the 2009-2010 school year,
leaders of the district were aware of the impact of these harsh discipline policies and were
setting the groundwork to respond accordingly through policy change. In particular, CPS
introduced three key discipline policy changes that have been responsible for a noticeable
shift away from zero tolerance policies and towards a restorative justice model in the past
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several years: the Culture of Calm Initiative, changes to the CPS Student Code of Conduct,
and the Suspensions and Expulsions Reduction Plan (SERP).
The Culture of Calm Initiative (CoC) was introduced first during the 2009-2010
school year with the goal of improving school climate by focusing on “leadership and staff
commitment; behavior frameworks; staff development; student development; community
engagement; and performance management” (Levenstein et al. n.p.). More specifically, six
high schools in the 2009-2010 school year, and nearly 40 high schools during the 2010-2011
school year, were provided funds to implement targeted behavioral programs, including
programs such as “peer juries, restorative justice, counseling, and other alternative practices
to help students develop better practices to help students develop better relationships with
peer and adults and to improve overall school climate” (Stevens et al. 8). This first initiative
shifted the district’s treatment of discipline towards restorative justice models. Such models
rely on an understanding of child development that is, in many ways, in direct opposition to
the dualistic understandings that had driven zero tolerance policies nationally and in CPS. It
was limited in its reach, though, as it was adopted in fewer than 50 schools district-wide, and
was only introduced at the high-school level.
During the 2012-2013 school year, CPS modified its Student Code of Conduct (SCC)
in a way that targeted existing suspension practices in CPS. More specifically, these changes
“eliminated automatic 10-day suspensions and required principals to seek district approval to
suspend students for more than five days” (8). Following in the path of the CoC initiative,
these changes also pushed for schools to continue to adopt of non-exclusionary practices,
such as peace circles and mentoring (8). Upon the Chicago Board of Education’s approval of
these changes, the CPS CEO at the time, Jean-Claude Brizard, proclaimed, “I am a strong
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believer in limiting mandatory disciplinary actions that remove a child from their classroom
and school, which, in many cases, ultimately causes more harm than good for those students”
(Chicago Public Schools 2012). These SCC changes were wide-ranging in their scope and
represented a direct attempt to shift away from zero tolerance practices. For example, the
changes further reduced the maximum OSS suspension days to three days maximum (down
from the 5-day limit) (CPS). It also involved a diversity of other changes, including a push to
use ISS over (or in combination with) OSS, an expansion of the Anti-Bullying Policy, a
modification of the restorative justice approaches, and more (CPS). Therefore, this policy
change grew out of the work of the CoC initiative, but introduced district-wide change24 in
ways that the CoC initiative never attempted to do.
Finally, during the 2013-2014 school year, CPS made additional changes to the SCC
and introduced the Suspensions and Expulsions Reduction Plan (SERP)— “a plan to
explicitly reduce the use of exclusionary disciplinary practices in schools” and to “try to
address the high rates of exclusionary disciplinary practices” (Stevens et al. 8). This effort, in
combination with the previous policy changes, is responsible for suspension and expulsion
rates in CPS reaching a record low in 2016 (CPS 2016). According to a publication produced
by CPS in September of 2016, these efforts drew out an intentional effort to target zero
tolerance policies and to dismantle the school-to-prison pipeline:
These improvements also follow a series of concerted efforts by the District to swap
out the punitive, zero tolerance disciplinary approach frequently applied in the past
with a holistic approach that works to address the root cause of student misconduct
and reduce the school-to-prison pipeline. To accomplish this paradigm shift, CPS will
continue to support and seek out programs that specifically support African American
male students. (CPS 2016)

24

For example, according to a presentation produced by Chicago Public Schools, there were a total of 217
schools that were trained to implement school-wide positive behavior support systems during the 2012-2013
school year (Office of College and Career Success, Chicago Public Schools).
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These policies grew out of the growing body of research literature about the negative effects
of zero tolerance in CPS. Given that these policy changes have been identified as direct
pivots away from zero tolerance policies, they provide a useful starting point to study the
effects of zero tolerance versus more restorative justice-oriented models through data. The
particular mechanisms for exploring the effects of these policies through data will be detailed
more extensively in Chapter 3. Given this background on CPS policies, this analysis will
shift gears and develop the empirical framework with which the econometric analysis will be
completed.

III. Empirical Framework
This analysis will use school-level panel data from high schools in CPS, from the
2011-2012 school year through the 2015-2016 school year. Therefore, the effects of zero
tolerance on educational outcomes will be measured at the school-level, rather than studentlevel. The focus on high schools in particular is important because these years of education
are viewed as most critical in the literature in terms of discipline’s effect on the school-toprison pipeline. In a 2015 report published by The University of Chicago Consortium on
Chicago School Research titled “Discipline Practices in Chicago Schools,” Stevens et al.
claim, “very high suspension rates in high schools account for 56 percent of out-of-school
suspensions districtwide. If the district is to reduce the use of suspensions and disciplinary
disparities substantially, it will require changes in high school practices” (3). Furthermore,
the channels of influence on educational outcome will therefore have to do largely with
changes in the culture and climate of any given school and the effects this may have on the
school’s outcomes at large, rather than providing the context to understand student-level
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effects of discipline.25 Before involving all of the controls in the regression model, this
analysis will first evaluate the model that isolates the effect of Disciplinary Punishment on
educational outcomes. The most basic form of this regression can be expressed as follows:
Educational Outcomes = β1Disciplinary Punishment + µ
In order to better understand the practicalities of this model, it is important to understand the
way both of these variables, and the controls, are defined and represented by the available
data.

Dependent Variable: Educational Outcomes
Educational Outcomes, the dependent variable, will be accounted for with two
separate measures: Freshman-on-Track (FOT)26 rate and Dropout rate (Dropout). The FOT is
defined as: “a measure of how many first-time freshmen are, by the end of their first year,
‘on track’ to graduate from high school within four years,” determined on the basis of credit
accumulation and course failures. (Network for College Success 1).27 The FOT rate has been
found to be highly related to the Dropout rate, as “CCSR research shows that freshmen who
finish their first year of high school on-track are more than three times as likely as those offtrack to graduate from high school within four year” (1). The CPS Data Guides do not
specify if students who are expelled are counted within this dropout measure. If they are
counted as such, then any relationship between expulsion and dropout rates that is discerned
25

While student-level panel data would have been ideal here, it was not publicly available in the context of CPS
and for discipline cases. Given the extensive personal information often included in such data sets, most of this
data is inaccessible in an effort to protect student, teacher, and school privacy.
26
The italicized words in parentheses are all the variable names on the regression tables that can be found at the
end of this document in the Tables section.
27
More specifically, a first-year freshman is considered to be “on-track” by the end of the year if they have “(i)
earned at least five course credits; (ii) failed no more than one semester of a core course—otherwise, s/she is off
track.” Students who dropout in their Freshman year are included in the metric as “off-track.” Additionally,
students who attend charter schools, jail schools, alternative schools, and/or special education schools are not
included in the FOT metrics (Network for College Success 1).
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in this analysis will be biased; however, the fact that this is a school-level analysis will help
control for some of that collinearity. Both the dropout rate and the FOT are arguably better
proxies of educational outcomes than measures like test scores, given that the literature that
reveals the pattern of schools selectively disciplining students with poorer academic
performance right before high-takes testing (Figlio 21). Also, given the ways that zero
tolerance policies are thought to put “at risk”28 students on a pipeline to prison, dropout rates
are a particularly revealing indicator for student’s academic performance.
In order to properly capture the effects of school discipline on educational outcomes,
my model will include regressions with both FOT and Dropout and a one-year lag on both of
the educational outcomes measures (LagFOT and LagDropout). This is critical to the model
because, without a lag, the model would report the instantaneous effects of discipline on
educational outcomes. This model assumes that the effects of school discipline on
educational outcomes are moderated by school culture as the mechanism for change, which
is not as volatile as individual effects might be. The LagFOT measures the effect of
discipline on the educational outcomes (FOT) of students who enter the school a year after
said discipline happens. This is because the model assumes that discipline affects school
culture in ways independent from individual student-level effects alone. Therefore, including
both the lagged and non-lagged versions of these measures of educational outcomes will help
determine if the effects on school culture are immediate, or if they might take time to go into

I put this in parentheses because much of the literature about “at risk” students has served to construct them
as the risk itself, which is antithetical to the goals of this work. Another way of distinguishing such students as
being completely autonomous over their conditions would be to refer to the dropout rate as the “push out rate,”
because this places the focus on the forces that cause students to not graduate (rather than placing the blame
entirely on them).
28
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effect—perhaps because the specific groups of students affected by the discipline are more
uniquely affected by the punishment.
Because of the potential ways in which FOT and Dropout rates may be correlated
with one and other, the empirical model of this analysis employs simultaneous equations, and
therefore runs the regressions for FOT alongside those for Dropout Rate. Additionally, all of
the regressions include fixed-effects, so as to control for school-level differences that may
exist, and a time trend to capture the effects by year, across all schools. All of these measures
are introduced in an effort to read through the large amount of noise inevitable with schoollevel data.

Independent Variable(s): Discipline Ratios
Given the difficulty in directly defining zero tolerance in the data, Disciplinary
Punishment will be defined in a variety of ways. The first measure, the number of students
expelled per school (# Expulsions), comes straight from the data set and is very selfexplanatory. The second set of measures is ratios that incorporate the severity of student
misconduct (by number of misconduct) and the type of punishment (by number of total
punishments). The basic form of these ratios is as follows:
Discipline Ratio: Total Misconduct (#)/Total Punishments (#)
This will be further specified both at the level of misconduct and punishment. By
incorporating the severity of misconduct into the model, this measure is designed to capture
the particular dynamics of zero tolerance as involving an increasing level of punishment for
lower-level offenses. Therefore, this ratio is able to serve as a proxy for the relative harshness
of punishment schools assign, given the amount and the severity of the misconduct they are
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dealing with. Low-level misconduct with high-level punishment, for example, might indicate
a school that is particularly “harsh” when it comes to school discipline, and vice versa.
The severity of misconduct is based on the classifications of behaviors provided by
the CPS. They classify misconduct within any one of six groups, with Group 1-level offenses
being the least severe and Group 6-level offenses being the most severe. One of the key
challenges of this analysis lies in the inability to know how well the school classifications of
level of misconduct match the actual severity of the misconduct. Some of the most “harsh”
schools in the data may therefore not be apparent, if they are more generous in how they
classify the severity of student misconduct.
Because their data pairs up these groups, this analysis marks Low Severity
Misconduct as Group 1 and 2 behavior, where Group 1 behaviors are those that are
“inappropriate” and Group 2 behaviors are those that “disrupt” (CPS “Student Code of
Conduct”). Examples provided by CPS of Group 1 behaviors are “Running and/or making
excessive noise in the hall or building,” “Leaving the classroom without permission,”
“Engaging in any behavior that is disruptive to the orderly process of classroom
instruction,”29 and others (18). Group 2 behaviors include things such as “Interfering with
school authorities and programs through walkouts or sit-ins,”30 “”Exhibiting or publishing
any profane obscene, indecent, immoral, libelous, or offensive materials, or using such
language or gestures,”31 “Failing to provide proper identification,”32 and others (20).33 The

29

It should be clear here that even the language of the CPS Student Code of Conduct is extremely ambiguous,
and therefore open to the discretion of individual schools and teachers (depending on the nature of their school).
The language of “any behavior that is disruptive to the orderly process of classroom instruction” in particular
raises some red flags and is reminiscent of the criticisms of language of “disorder” as extremely coded (in terms
of race, language, disability status, etc.).
30
It is telling of the overall school climate that likely peaceful expressions of student resistance, such as
walkouts or sit-ins, are marked as second degree disciplinary behaviors.
31
Again, the language of “immoral” or “libelous” or “indecent” is openly ambiguous to a concerning degree.
This language seems as though it would make it much easier for teachers and schools to become increasingly
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Student Code also lists “Available Interventions and Consequences” for each group of
behavior and it is worth noting that “Skill-building in-school suspension up to three days” is
not present for Group 1 behaviors, but it is introduced for Group 2 behaviors (20). All levels
of misconduct recommend “instructive, corrective, or restorative response” (18-30).
This analysis defines Mid Severity Misconduct as Group 3 and 4 behaviors, where
they are each defined as characterizing behavior that “seriously disrupt[s]” and “very
seriously disrupt[s]” respectively (14). Example of Group 3 behaviors include, but are not
limited to: “Fighting” (without injury), “Forgery,” “Plagiarizing,” “Overt display of gang
affiliation,” “Bullying behaviors,” and “Any behavior not otherwise listen in Group 1
through 3 of this SCC that seriously disrupt the educational process”34 (22). At this level of
behaviors, out-of-school suspensions up to three days are interventions available to schools
(22). Group 4 behaviors include “Extortion,” “Assault,” “Vandalism,” “Battery,” “Possession
of any dangerous object as defined by this SCC, direct documented behavior,” “Any
behavior not otherwise listed in Groups 1 through 4 of this SCC that very seriously disrupts
the educational process,” and several others (24-25). Both of these levels of behavior list both
“Skill-building in-school suspension, out-of-school suspension, or combination in-school and
out-of-school suspension up to three days” as available methods for intervention (22).
And finally, High Severity Misconduct is defined by Group 5 and Group 6 behaviors,
which are used to classify behaviors that “most seriously disrupt” and that are “illegal” AND
“most seriously disrupt,” respectively. Group 5 behaviors include, but are not limited to,

harsher with their punishments of lower-level offenses, while working within the same framework that was
supposedly experiencing shifts away from harsh discipline measures.
32
It is unclear what sort of identification is necessary here, but one would assume students would need nothing
more than a school-issued ID.
It is not made clear in the student code which behaviors might “seriously disrupt the educational process,” or
what that even really means (22).
34
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“Aggravated assault,’ “Burglary,” “Engaging in or attempting any illegal behavior which
interferes with the school’s educational process,” “Persistent or severe acts of sexual
harassment,” and “Second or repeated violation of Behavior 4-13, possession of any
dangerous object as defined by this SCC” (26-27). At the Group 5 level of behaviors, the
“request for expulsion hearing” and “Request for assignment to an intervention program by
the Chief Executive Officer or designee” (26-30). For the Group 6 level behaviors, the
Student Code notes the ability for principals of students in fifth grade and below to hold an
expulsion hearing for those students as well (31).
Given these definitions for Low, Mid, and High Severity Misconduct, it is possible to
define the Punishment Ratios that will be employed in this analysis. To capture the particular
dynamics of zero tolerance as increasing punishment to low-level offenses, the following
three basic ratios will be included in the regression model:
Low Severity Ratio: Low Severity Misconduct (Groups 1 and 2)/ Total Punishment
Mid Severity Ratio: Mid Severity Misconduct (Groups 3 and 4)/ Total Punishment
High Severity Ratio: High Severity Misconduct (Groups 5 and 6)/ Total Punishment
All of these ratios will be included in the same regressions, so as to differentiate the impact
of each of these ratios on educational outcomes. “Total Punishment” is measured by using
the sum of misconduct resulting in OSS, ISS, Police Notification, and Expulsions. Therefore,
in order to catch the independent effects of each of the forms of punishment, the regressions
will be performed using Total Punishment, Number Suspensions, and Number of Police
Notifications35 to generate ratios. Using these ratios, there will be 9 separate sets of

35

Expulsions are measured as a separate variable in the regression and not included as a ratio, given that they
are fundamentally different from other forms of punishment in that they result in the removal of a student from
that school (and that school’s data).
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simultaneous equations run with Dropout Rate and FOT. To help better understand the
forthcoming regression tables, each of those ratios is defined as follows:
Figure 3.1 Definitions of Punishment Ratios in Regression Model 36
Variable Name

Definition

Total Punishment Ratio

Total # of Reported Misconduct (# Groups 1-2 + #Groups 3-4 +
#Group 4-5) /Total Discipline (# ISS + #OSS + #Police
Notifications + #Expulsions)
Total # of Low-Level Misconduct (# Groups 1-2)/Total Discipline
Total # of Mid-Level Misconduct (# Groups 3-4)/Total Discipline
Total # of High-Level Misconduct (# Groups 5-6)/Total
Discipline
Total # of Reported Misconduct/Total Suspensions (#ISS +
#OSS)
Total # of Low-Level Misconduct (# Groups 1-2)/Total
Suspensions
Total # of Mid-Level Misconduct (# Groups 3-4)/Total
Suspensions
Total # of High-Level Misconduct (# Groups 5-6)/Total
Suspensions
Total # of Reported Misconduct/Total Police Notif. (# Police
Notifications)

Low Punish Ratio
Mid Punish Ratio
High Punish Ratio
Suspension Ratio
Low Suspension Ratio
Mid Suspension Ratio
High Suspension Ratio
Police Notif. Ratio

Low Police Ratio

Total # of Low-Level Misconduct (# Groups 1-2)/Total Police
Notif.

Mid Police Ratio

Total # of Mid-Level Misconduct (# Groups 3-4)/Total Police
Notif.
Total # of High-Level Misconduct (# Groups 5-6)/Total Police
Notif.

High Police Ratio

Independent Variable(s): Race
Another one of the difficulties of using school-level panel data, rather than studentlevel panel data, is that the data on race that is available is just a percentage composition of
schools by each race. The marginal effects of each percentage change in any given race in a

36

All of these variable names in Figures 1 and 2 map on directly to the variables in the regression tables, so it
may be useful to read those tables with these definitions handy.
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school might not capture the effects of race on educational outcomes as much as an
individual student’s race might have on their individual educational outcomes. It is also
critical to note that CPS is composed of a majority of students of color, and much of the
literature on the effects of race on educational outcomes frames students of color as the
minorities in their schools; therefore, there are grounds to investigate more specific indicators
for race in the context of this analysis. In response to these challenges and the dynamics of
race addressed in the Literature Review in Chapter 2, this analysis will not use the Race data
directly in the regressions, but instead utilizes a proxy for Racial Density.
Racial Density is an indicator that has been adapted from the Herfindahl-Hirchman
Index (HHI) typically associated in housing markets to indicate market concentration. The
basic goal of this [0-1] indicator is to designate whether a market (or in this case, a school) is
concentrated in any one firm (in this case, racial group). The HHI used for the Racial Density
index was therefore calculated by taking the three largest Racial groups in the data apart from
the White group37 (Black, Latino, and Asian) and scaling the percentage values for each of
these groups per school to a 0-1 scale (i.e. such that 35 percent becomes 0.35). For each
school, the scaled percentage values for each racial group is then squared and added up to
create the index. Therefore, a value closer to 0 would indicate that there is no racial group
with a strong majority over the others, whereas the values closest to 1 indicate that the racial
composition of a school is inclined towards one racial group.
In addition to this Racial Density index, this analysis seeks to parse out whether there
are different effects by which racial group dominates the student composition, or if it is the
relative densities alone that have an effect on educational outcomes. Therefore, there are

37

Whites are intentionally excluded from this index to isolate the effects of concentrated Black and Latino
populations.
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(0,1) dummies coded for Black Majority and Latino Majority, such that if a schools largest
racial group is Black or Latino, then they are coded as “1.” To capture the interactive effects
of a school being both a Black or Latino Majority and having a high Racial Density index,
this model also includes both of those interactive effects: Racial Density*Black (Majority)
and Racial Density*Latino (Majority). This is different from the Black Majority and Latino
Majority indexes alone because it factors in the extent to which either group dominates the
overall composition of any given school; a school might have a racial group that is
considered a “majority” if it is 30 percent of the total school demographics, but the effects of
such a majority might be qualitatively different than a school that has 100 percent Black or
Latino students. To help better understand the forthcoming regression tables, each of those
ratios is defined as follows:
Figure 3.2 Definitions of Racial Density Measures
Variable Name

Definition

Racial Density

Racial Density*Black

This is a 0-1 Herfindahl-Hirchman Index (HHI) for race.
Accordingly, it was calculated as follows:
(Percentage Black)2 + (Percentage Latino)2 +
(Percentage Asian)2
This is a (0,1) dummy where “1” indicates that the greatest
percentage of students in that school are Black. This is
therefore more of a plurality, than majority, per se.
This is a (0, 1) dummy where “1” indicates that the greatest
percentage of students in that school are Latino.
Interaction Term: Racial Density x Black Majority

Racial Density*Latino

Interaction Term: Racial Density x Latino Majority

Black Majority

Latino Majority

Independent Variable(s): Demographic Controls
For the three other primary demographic controls incorporated in the model—IEP,
Bilingual, EconDisad--the variables will be taken directly from the data set and not
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reconfigured in any ways with the exception of an interaction term between IEP and Black,
but it is still worth clarifying what each variable means in the context of this data set.
IEP—or Individualized Education Program—denotes the percentage of students who
have reported disabilities and therefore receive special education services. An IEP itself is a
legal document that is designed to help teachers better adapt to the particular learning goals
and needs of those students (Stansberry). While students with an IEP have more protections
than other students in terms of due process because of the Individuals with Disabilities Act
(IDEA), students with an IEP can and do still experience zero tolerance practices. In the CPS
Student Code of Conduct, it specifies that students with an IEP can receive less punishment
than other students might for committing a single infraction; however, they are also eligible
for extensive punishments. The Code of Contact more specifically notes, “School officials
may suspend students with disabilities/impairments and cease educational services for a total
of up to 10 consecutive or 10 cumulative school days in one school year without providing
procedural safeguards” (CPS “Code of Conduct”).
IEP*PercentageBlack is an interaction term that was generated in response to the
surveyed literature suggesting that there are particular effects for students who are both Black
and have an IEP. This variable was generated by interacting the IEP and Black variables
straight from the data set. It should be noted that this Black variable was the percentage of
Black students in a given school, rather than the Black Majority or Racial Density*Black
variables developed above.
Bilingual is the district data’s name for students who are English Learners (ELs).
How such students are classified in districts can be a political question, so it is worth
clarifying how CPS, specifically, defines students as ELs. More specifically, when a student
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is enrolled in any school in CPS, they legal guardian is asked to complete a Home Language
Survey, which includes two questions: “Is a language other than English spoken in your
home? Does the student speak a language other than language?” (CPS “Language and
Cultural Education”). Based on the results to that questionnaire, prospective EL students are
screened on the basis of listening, speaking, reading and writing, and placed in age and grade
levels and potentially placed in the EL program, if they qualify: “If, based on the test score,
the student is considered and EL, the student will then be placed into a Transitional Bilingual
Education Program or a transitional Program of Instruction” (CPS). The “Bilingual” group in
CPS data is therefore distinct from students enrolled in the district’s Dual Language Program,
which EL and non-EL students alike can opt into (CPS).
EconDisad is the best proxy for the socioeconomic composition that was available in
the data. A student is considered to be “economically disadvantaged” if they “[…] come
from families whose income is within 185 percent of the federal poverty line” (CPS “School
Data”). These are ultimately the same students that the district defines as “Free or Reduced
Lunch Eligible Students” (CPS). Therefore, this measure has nothing to do directly about
school funding or the resources available at a given school. Given the close relationship
between students’ socioeconomic status and the resources available to their school, though,
these are very interrelated concepts.
While the definition for each of the demographic control variables is fairly straight
forward, they will be summarized by the following definitions as a more accessible reference
point for understanding the regression tables. The variable names listed for each variables
map on directly to the variable names on the regression tables (Table 2; Table 3; Table 4;
Table 5). These definitions are as follows:
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Figure 3.3 Definitions of Demographic Control Measures
Variable Name

Definition

IEP

Percentage of students in a school with part of the
Individualized Education Program; proxy for special
education/students with a disability
Percentage of students in a school for whom English is not
their primary language
Percentage of students in a school who are considered
“economically disadvantaged”
Interaction term between the Percentage of Students with an
IEP and the Percentage of Black students in a school

Bilingual
EconDisad
IEP*PercentageBlack

Setting up Regression Model
From these definitions, it is possible to build up the regression model. The first
regression will be as follows:
(1) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1Total Punishment Ratio + β2#
Expelled + β2Time Trend+ µ
This sets a baseline for the model by excluding all of the various controls and looking first to
see if there is any relationship between Disciplinary Punishment and Educational Outcomes,
all other controls withstanding, except for the Time Trend and the fixed effects. It is
important to note here that, in building up the full regression model, I only use the Total
Punishment Ratio, and do not disaggregate it by level of misconduct or level of punishment
(i.e. any of the other ratios included in Figure 3.1). Only after that full model is build up will
be applied to each of the different punishment ratios (for the sake of not including an
excessive number of tables). The predicted results of these models are explored more in
depth in the following section.
Given this initial regression, it is possible to build the model up. There are two sets of
controls – Race and Demographics (i.e. Bilingual, IEP, and Economically Disadvantaged).
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These sets of controls will be introduced separately in the regression model before both being
included in the complete model. Black students have been found to be three times as likely to
be suspended than their white peers, so they are a critical group to consider in questions of
race and suspension rates (Morris and Perry 70). Furthermore, a study performed by The
Civil Rights Project at UCLA found that 10.8 percent of Latino students are suspended,
compared to only 6.7 percent of White students and 2.5 percent of Asian students (Losen et
al. 4). Therefore, these racial categories are the most represented in the data and existing data
suggests they are either highly represented (i.e. in the case of Blacks and Latinos) in the pool
of suspended students, or not represented that much (i.e. in the case of Whites).38 The second
set of regressions will accordingly be as follows:
(2) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1Total Punishment Ratio+ + β2#
Expelled + β3# Time Trend + β4Black+ β5 Latino + µ
Based on existing literature, I expect both racial categories will have a negative relationship
with educational outcomes. The Black and Latino variables both reflect the percentage of
students in a school of that respective racial identity. Therefore, I expect an increase in either
of these variables to be associated with a negative change in FOT and a positive change in
Dropout. Given the problems with using these straight percentage values, rather than the
Racial Density indexes though, I expect the race-effects at this level of the model will not be
as pronounced as they might be one the Racial Density measure is incorporated.
After testing these racial variables directly, the Racial Density measures will be
introduced. So as to avoid collinearity, the original measures of Race (by percentage) will be
taken out from the regressions.

38

The majority of this paragraph (i.e. the references to existing literature) are taken from my Applied
Econometrics paper, “Examining the Effects of Race on Suspension Rate between ‘Low’ and ‘High’ Quality
Chicago Public Schools.”

Kaul 68
(3) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1Total Punishment Ratio+ β2#
Expelled+ β3Time Trend + β4Racial Density + β5BlackMaj + β6LatinoMaj +
β7Racial Density*BlackMaj+ β8Racial Density*LatinoMaj + µ
Based on existing literature, I expect Racial Density*BlackMaj and Racial
Density*LatinoMaj to both have negative relationships with Educational Outcomes (i.e. a
negative relationship with FOT and positive relationship with Dropout). I predict that these
values are more economically significant than either of the straight race measures, Black or
Latino, because they capture the more specific dynamics that might affect educational
outcomes at a school-level. It is unclear how Racial Density might affect educational
outcomes by itself; however, given that the overall make-up of CPS is primarily students of
color, a high Racial Density is likely to be relatively correlated with either BlackMaj or
LatinoMaj, so it seems likely that the Racial Density index is also associated with negative
educational outcomes.
The next regression will also build off of the initial regression, this time by including
the Demographic Controls—Economically Disadvantaged, IEP, and Bilingual. Like the
Race controls, each of these controls captures the percentage of each school composed of
students who are economically disadvantaged, have an IEP, and are bilingual (respectively).
The model for this set of regressions is as follows.
(4) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1Total Punishment Ratio+ β2#
Expelled + β3Time Trend + β4IEP+ β5Bilingual + β6EconDisad+ µ
These measures are introduced without the Race variables at first, so as to first evaluate their
independent effects on Educational Outcomes. Based on existing literature, I would expect
schools with higher percentages of Economically Disadvantaged students, students with
IEPs, and Bilingual students to have poorer educational outcomes. In the case of these
demographic controls, the causal mechanisms that might mediate these effects on educational
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outcomes is the access to educational resources and/or school quality. Something worth
noting is that many of the students with an IEP potentially classify for protections under the
Individuals for Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)—depending on their particular learning
and/or developmental needs—which would affect the level of due process they receive in
disciplinary cases. Therefore, the IEP variable may affect Educational Outcomes in ways that
are less mediated through discipline than other variables, such as race.
After having identified the independent effects of both sets of controls, the following
regression model will include all controls:
(5) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1Total Punishment Ratio + β2#
Expelled + β3Time Trend + β4Racial Density + β5BlackMaj + β6IEP + β7Bilingual +
β8EconDisad+ + β9EconDisad + β10Racial Density*BlackMaj +
β11IEP*PercentageBlack + µ
All of these regressions will be performed using cross-sectional data controlling for fixedeffects, so the model attempts to control for any potential school-level constants. LatinoMaj
and its interaction term with Racial Density are both removed from this fifth regression in
order to control for multi-collinearity. The Latino variable and Bilingual are highly positively
correlated, with a correlational coefficient of 0.7285, so removing the Latino variables serves
as an attempt to control for this problem. It does over-simplify the model in not including
these variables in some ways, but Bilingual was more relevant to the model (i.e. more
economically and statistically significant in the regressions), so it was more critical to include
that channel of influence.
Finally, the last regression of the foundational model for this analysis is the fifth
regression, except using a 1-year lag for both Educational Outcome measures:
(6) 1-Year Lagged Educational Outcomes (LagDropout, LagFOT) = β1Total
Punishment Ratio + β2# Expelled + β3Time Trend + β4Racial Density + β5BlackMaj
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+ β6IEP + β7Bilingual + β8EconDisad+ + β9EconDisad + β10Racial
Density*BlackMaj + IEP*PercentageBlack + µ
This regression is included in order to account for the effects of discipline on educational
outcomes that might be the instantaneous results of changes in school culture. For example, if
a large number of students are notified to the police in one year, this lag would capture the
longer-term effects of that punishment on the overall school’s dropout rate and Freshman
On-Track rate.
Given this full model, I will then apply the final regressions—Regressions 5 and 6—
with each of the various punishment levels defined in Figure 3.1. In other words, the
punishment ratios for Total Punishment, Suspension, and Police Notification will each be
regressed using the ratios that include total misconduct, as well as the disaggregated levels of
misconduct. The basic forms of non-lagged and lagged regressions that are disaggregated by
punishment ratios are as follows:
(7) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1LowPunishRatio +
β2MidPunishRatio + β3HighPunishRatio + β4# Expelled + β5Time Trend + β6Racial
Density + β7BlackMaj + β8IEP + β9Bilingual + β10EconDisad+ β11EconDisad +
β12Racial Density*BlackMaj + β13IEP*PercentageBlack + µ
(8) 1-Year Lagged Educational Outcomes (LagDropout, LagFOT) =
β1LowPunishRatio + β2MidPunishRatio + β3HighPunishRatio + β4# Expelled +
β5Time Trend + β6Racial Density + β7BlackMaj + β8IEP + β9Bilingual +
β10EconDisad+ β11EconDisad + β12Racial Density*BlackMaj +
β13IEP*PercentageBlack + µ
Therefore, for each form of punishment, there will be 8 total regressions: total
misconduct ratios un-lagged and lagged and disaggregated misconduct ratios un-lagged and
lagged, for both Dropout and FOT. These numbered regressions correspond directly to the
basic form used for the numbered regressions on the regression tables; the only difference is
that Total Punish Ratio is replaced with Suspension Ratio and Police Notif. Ratio, and their
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disaggregated correlates, in the other regressions (Table 4; Table 5). The full regressions for
Total Punishment are not included in Table 1 with the rest of the build-up for the model, and
are instead included in Table 2 with the rest of the full regressions for Total Punishment. The
full breakdown of regressions performed for this analysis will become clearer in the
regression tables.
Given these models, I expect the findings using the lagged educational outcomes to
be more significant than the non-lagged outcomes because they will better capture the
aggregated student effects and the more ambiguous measure of instantaneous “changes in
school culture.” The literature review also provides context to believe that race will be
significant (Black; Latino; BlackMaj; LatinoMaj), but that the proxy for racial segregation
(Racial Density) will be more significant when it is interacted with these same race variables
(Racial Density*BlackMaj). It is difficult to make predictions regarding whether dropout
rates or the FOT will be better accounted for by the model; however, given that FOT is an
index that is created whereas dropout rates are a more binary indicator for which marginal
changes have more profound impacts on a school, I predict dropout rates to be a better
indicator of educational outcomes in this model. I also expect all findings regarding the
demographic controls to be in line with the conclusions of existing literature—that is, having
a higher density of students with an IEP, who are ELs, and who are economically
disadvantaged will be associated with worse educational outcomes for a school. Finally, the
key question of this analysis whether or not zero tolerance policies (measured by the
punishment ratios) will have a negative or positive effect on educational outcomes. I predict
that the “harsher” a school is, the less effective their punishment will be. In other words, if a
school has a low level of misconducts but still opts for a high level of punishment, then that
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school is employing harsher discipline policies and I expect there to reach a point in the
disaggregated punishment ratios (i.e. low, mid, high) where punishment begins to be
associated with negative, rather than positive, education outcomes. This is to suggest that
punishment is not categorically bad (for educational outcomes, and otherwise), but
disproportionately harsh punishments are.
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Chapter 4
Findings from Chicago Public Schools

Given this background on Chicago and the existing literature, it is possible to look
more closely at the data available from Chicago Public Schools. This chapter will begin with
an analysis of the data in question to pick up any initial trends and make predictions on the
potential findings of the model. The second section will detail the findings from the
regression, and will be followed by the third section, which discusses some of the potential
shortfalls of this particular data set. Finally, this chapter will conclude with potential takeaway lessons for the US education system at large. The following chapter will draw
conclusions for the nation and large and suggest policy recommendations accordingly.

I. Data Analysis
This analysis will employ data from the Chicago Public School (CPS) District’s
public school data files from the 2011-2012 through 2015-2016 school years. More
specifically, this analysis pulls data from the “Limited English Proficiency, Special Ed, Low
Income, IEP,” “Dropout and Graduation,” “Freshman On-Track,” and “Suspensions and
Expulsions” sub-reports for each school year. The information in these data sets was
collected through the forms CPS requires all students’ guardians fill out at the start of every
school year. Each observation within these data sets represents one school (K-12);
accordingly, the demographic-based variables (e.g. bilingual status, special education status,
economic status, and racial categories) are all represented with a percentage value that
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represents the percentage of students with that particular demographic feature at that
particular school.39
The central research question of this analysis is: What is the impact of zero tolerance
policies on two specific educational outcomes (dropout rates and Freshman On-track rate) in
K-12 schools in the United States? Given the scope of this data, this case study will be
necessarily limited to Chicago Public Schools. Furthermore, because the educational
outcomes that are of most interest in the context of the school-to-prison pipeline are dropout
rates and the Freshman On-Track rates, this naturally reduces the scope of this case study to
be focused on high schools in CPS. Given that the literature on zero tolerance and the schoolto-prison pipeline in particular are focused on the impact of punishment at these later
outcomes in K-12 education, this focus fits naturally into the existing literature’s causal
story. Therefore, this case study will ask a slightly more refined research question, that is:
What is the impact of zero tolerance policies on dropout rates and the Freshman On-track
rate in high schools in the Chicago Public Schools district, and what do these findings reveal
about the larger national story of zero tolerance and educational outcomes? Therefore,
following the specific analysis of high schools in CPS, this analysis will seek to draw
connections to the national context of the US education system.
A first take at analyzing the summary statistics of this data by school year, reveals a
few things of note. For one, the mean percentage of misconduct that resulted in OSS (43.339
%) vastly exceeded the percentage of misconduct that resulted in ISS in the 2011-2012
school year (29.2%) (Table 1). This is significant, given that OSS is typically understood as
the harsher form of suspension, given that it forces students physically outside of their school

39

Some of the wording of this paragraph was borrowed from the Applied Econometrics paper I wrote in Fall
2016, “Examining the Effects of Race on Suspension Rates between ‘Low’ and ‘High’ Quality Public Schools.”
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communities. However, when these rates are graphed over time, it is interesting to see them
to change fairly proportionate to one and other, despite discipline policy changes during this
time in CPS (Figure 4.1). Perhaps this reveals the impacts of such changes were more
realized among other forms of punishment.
Figure 4.1 Mean OSS and ISS Rates
Over Time40

Figure 4.2 Mean Numbers of
Misconduct by Severity over Time

It is worth noting, also, that the amount of misconduct being reported in CPS during the time
period of interest in this analysis remained fairly constant for Mid- and High-level of
misconduct; however, there was a spike in Low-level misconduct (Figure 4.2). This may be
due to genuine changes in the behavior of students, or perhaps due to increased policing of
low-level misconduct during this time. It is not possible to discern that causal story from this
figure alone though.
Another interesting trend to note that is consistent with what one would expect from
the policy changes and existing literature on CPS is that the average number of Expulsions
per one hundred students has consistently decreased over time (Figure 4.3). This measure is

While the graph designates each school year with only one year, it should be noted that “2011” indicates
“2011-2012 school year,” “2012” indicates “2012-2013 school year,” and so on. Therefore, the full range of
data being represented is 2011-2016, and not 2011-2015, as may seem more intuitive, given the graph.
40
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on a different scale than the “PerISS” and “PerOSS” measurements, as the latter
measurements are percentages and the Expulsion measure is an average. All of these
measurements may also have overlap in the students receiving any given form of punishment
as well—i.e. none of these measurements attempt to capture the number of unique students
who receive any of the given forms of punishment.
Figure 4.3 Mean Numbers of Expulsions per 100 Students41 Over Time (2011-2016)

This graphically represents the changes in one of the strictest forms of disciplinary
punishment available to schools. It helps to contextualize the Suspensions and Expulsions
Reduction Plan (SERP), in particular. Introduced in February 2013, this policy that focused
on targeted reductions in the suspension and expulsion rates. Reading Figures 4.1 and 4.2 in
relation to one and other might reveal that SERP was indeed successful at reducing
suspensions, even though that is not apparent in Figure 4.1 alone; if there was an increase in
misconduct (as Figure 4.2 suggests) alongside relatively constant suspension practices (as
Figure 4.1 suggests), then it is entirely possible that schools were in fact becoming less strict
41

The regression work of this analysis uses a slightly different measure of expulsions: the total number of
expulsions per school; however this measure of average expulsions per 100 students provides a better picture of
the scaled changes across the district over time.
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with punishment during this time and there were simply increases in behavioral misconduct.
None of these observed trends in the data are too surprising, but it is helpful to see the
particular effects of CPS’s policy changes manifested in their actual suspension and
expulsion numbers.
Another important trend that becomes apparent through a graphical analysis of the
data set is the relative changes in the educational outcomes—FOT rates and dropout rates—
over time. The FOT rates and Dropout rates are measuring opposite ends of educational
outcomes—i.e. the higher the FOT, the better the educational outcomes of first year high
school students (whereas the inverse is true for the dropout rate).
Figure 4.4 Mean FOT Rates Over Time

Figure 4.5 Mean Dropout Rates Over
Time

Though it is not possible to establish any causal story based on these descriptive stats, there
is reason to further investigate the relationship between FOT rates and dropout rates, given
that they are also strongly negatively correlated with a correlational coefficient of -0.5940. It
is notable that the FOT rate drops in the same year that the dropout rate is at its peak. It
seems plausible that the decreases in the FOT rate and increases in the dropout rate may have
similar causal mechanisms—i.e. similar changing conditions in schools may be responsible
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for both changes. It is perhaps relevant to note that the 2014-2015 school year is the same
one where there was an observed flip between the percentages of misconduct that result in an
OSS versus an ISS.
Furthermore, it is worth investigating the spread of the distribution for the use of
various punishments across schools to better contextualize the data because the preceding
time trends concerned with changes in discipline police (Figure 4.1; Figure 4.3) rely on
yearly means across all schools. This aggregated view of the data provides a better scope of
the range of disciplinary practice used across the district and the relative distributions of each
form of punishment being employed by schools.
Figure 4.6 Distributions of Percentage of Misconducts Resulting in ISS, OSS, and Police
Notification42

While the most limited form of punishment employed by schools in the data set is police
notification, there appear to be a number of outlier schools with very high levels of police
notification of misconduct (Figure 4.6). This distribution is helpful in visualizing the spread
42

Expulsions were excluded from this box plot because, while all three of these measures were calculated in
terms of the percentage of misconduct that resulted in each form of punishment, the expulsion measurement in
the data set is the number of expulsions per 100 students. These are fundamentally non-analogous measures, so
it did not make sense to have them plotted using the same y-axis.
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of data; however, looking at the distribution of such punishments in relation to particular
levels of punishment would be even more helpful. This level of data is unfortunately not
disaggregated in the data set though.
To better understand the relation between punishment and actual behavioral
misconduct, it is helpful to look more closely at the ratios of misconduct over punishment.
Again, these measures were created in an effort to capture the degree to which a school is
“zero tolerance”—i.e. a value of “1” would indicate that a school administers a suspension,
expulsion, or police notification for every behavioral misconduct. A higher ratio, therefore,
indicates that a higher number of behavioral misconduct/infractions are not resulting in ISS,
OSS, expulsion, or police notification. It is possible that this gap between total misconduct
and total punishment is being addressed through less punitive measures (perhaps restorative
justice models), but it is not possible to be sure, given this particular graphical representation
of the data and what is available in the data set.

Figure 4.7 Mean Total Punishment Ratio over Time
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It is interesting to note that the mean Total Punishment Ratio goes up after 2013, the year the
Student Code of Conduct was modified (Figure 4.7). Given that these changes were designed
to minimize the use of punitive measures used by schools and to shift more towards
alternative methods of treatment like peace circles, this might explain the fact that there was
a higher amount of misconduct that was not resulting in ISS, OSS, expulsion, or police
notification after 2013. The change the in the mean Total Punishment ratio, however, is not
particularly large though, which may have to do with the fact that such changes in the Code
of Conduct may have affected different schools to different degrees (i.e. schools who
previously used harsher methods of punishment would be forced to change their practices
more than a school that did not) (Table 1).
In terms of changes in the composition of the student body, there are also several
interesting things to note. The three features of the student body that analysis will control for
(beyond racial measures) are the percentages of students who are bilingual, with an IEP, and
who are economically disadvantaged, as these may affect the educational outcomes at the
school-level. Changes in each of these demographic groups over time may, therefore, help
understand the regression analysis, in relation to policy changes in CPS. In order to
understand any potential trends that may exist, over time or across schools, for each of these
three demographic controls, it is useful to look at their distributions and mean values (across
the district) over time. These figures will provide a better context for demographic shifts
within the city of Chicago itself.

Kaul 81
Figure 4.8 Mean Percentage of Students with
an IEP over Time

Figure 4.9 Histogram of Percentage
Students with an IEP per School

Firstly, the mean percentage of students who have an IEP across CPS has increased
by over a percentage point between the 2011-2012 and 2015-2016 school years (Figure 4.8).
While this is not a tremendous increase, it is worth noting as a potential consequence of the
policy changes shifting away from zero tolerance—i.e. it is conceivable that more students
become diagnosed with a behavioral or learning disability when the culture of their school
shifts to being more restorative. Inherent in the dualism of zero tolerance is an understanding
of students as either “good” or “bad” so it may make sense for schools with harsh zero
tolerance policies to pay less attention to picking up on disabilities with students who are
misbehaving or not performing optimally, so this increase in IEPs would be interesting to
further investigate. Furthermore, the data is fairly skewed, with a number of outliers who
have 100 percent of their student body with IEPs (Figure 4.9). These outliers are most likely
schools with a special instructional focus on students with disabilities. Some of these schools
may have more specialized discipline plans, so it may be worth further investigating the other
aspects of those schools to see if they should be excluded from this particular analysis.
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Figure 4.10 Mean Percentage of Bilingual
Students over Time

Figure 4.11 Histogram of Percentage
Bilingual Students per School

Secondly, there is a parallel increase in the average percentage of bilingual students
per school of almost two percent (Figure 4.10). This demographic change could either
indicate that the schools in CPS were failing to provide English education for students with
limited English proficiency, or that there were new students entering the CPS school district
during this time with limited English proficiency. Again though, this is a relatively small
change, so it is a possible that this slight increase is natural, and not due to either of the
aforementioned causes. It is interesting though, that the highest percentage of schools have a
mean percentage of bilingual students of 0 percent (Figure 4.10). Furthermore, the district
reports that 17.17 percent of their students are considered English Language Learners
(ELL),43 as of the 2016-2017 school year across grade levels, so the lower percentage of such
students reported in Figure 4.11 suggests that most of these EL/Bilingual students must be
concentrated in lower grade-levels (CPS “CPS Stats and Facts”). That makes sense, given
that many of those students must learn English at lower grade levels, prior to high school.

43

The CPS website and data sources seem to use ELL and Bilingual interchangeably, referring to the same
groups of students.
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Figure 4.12 Mean Percentage of
Economically Disadvantaged Students over

Figure 4.13 Histogram of
Disadvantaged Students per School

Thirdly, the data on the percentage of economically disadvantaged students per
school over time also revel some interesting trends. There was a several percentage point
drop in the 2014-2015 school year before the number went back up in the 2015-2016 school
year (Figure 4.12). This change likely is just reflective of changes in economic growth in
CPS during this time period. While this analysis will not integrate any data about the city of
Chicago itself, rather than just the school district, it may be helpful to compare these changes
in the percentages of economically disadvantaged students with some proxy of
socioeconomic status for the city at large. It is also interesting that the distribution of the
percentage of economically disadvantaged students over time is most concentrated at and
around 100 percent (Figure 4.13). This variable, in particular, is revealing about the larger
overall climate of Chicago, beyond the school district alone, because it captures the changing
demographics of the students’ families as well as themselves. Because Figure 4.13 is not
disaggregated by school year, this may be overly concentrating schools around 100 percent,
when in reality, some schools may fluctuate more than is possible to discern than from either
of these figures.
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Figure 4.14 Scatterplot Black and White
White Students in School by Racial Density
Index

Figure 4.15 Scatterplot of Latino and
Students in School by Racial Density
Index

Finally, it is helpful to look more closely at the Racial Density index data to learn
more about the nature of segregation in CPS. While the parabolic nature of this scatterplot
distribution is not surprising, because it reflects the ways in which the Racial Density index
was calculated (i.e. using the squared values of non-White racial groups that made up the
largest portion of CPS high schools), Figures 4.14 and 4.15 are very revealing about the
nature of racial segregation that CPS experiences. More specifically, as schools become more
racially segregated in the case of CPS high schools, they become less white. The Racial
Density index therefore is highly associated with increases in the percentage of students of
color who compose a school. The correlational coefficient of Black and Racial Density is
0.578, which is fairly strongly positive. Strangely though, the correlational coefficient of
Latino and Density is -0.260, perhaps suggesting that the highly segregated schools
traditionally have a Black majority in CPS high schools. The interactive effects of Black
Majority schools with Racial Density will, therefore, be further explored to discern any
unique effects of highly segregated Black schools on educational outcomes.
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II. Results
The findings involving the misconduct-punishment ratios were the most interesting,
and informative, in the context of the primary research question of this econometric analysis,
that is: What are the effects of zero tolerance discipline policies on educational outcomes in
Chicago public schools? Across all punishment ratios (i.e. the Total Punishment Ratio,
Suspension Ratio, and Police Notif. Ratio), the ratios of mid-severity misconduct over
punishment were associated with negative educational outcomes, whereas the ratios of highseverity misconduct over punishment were associated with positive educational outcomes
(Table 3; Table 4; Table 5). In other words, when there was a higher ratio of high-severity
misconduct associated with the punishment a school was employing, those schools had lower
dropout rates and higher a FOT rate. Whereas, when the ratio of mid-severity misconduct
increased in relation to the punishment a school was employing, those schools had higher
dropout rates and a lower FOT rate. For example, for each point increase in the High
Suspension Ratio (i.e. the ratio of the number Groups 5 and 6 misconduct in a school over
their total number of suspensions), the dropout rate is expected to be 2.4 percentage points
lower and the FOT rate is expected to be 8.1 percentage points higher (statistically significant
at 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively) (Table 4). For the Mid Suspension Ratio, a one-point
increase in the ratio is associated with a 2 percent decrease in the FOT rate (statistically
significant at the 10 percent levels) (Table 4). It is worth clarifying what this means more
specifically, given the difficulty in translating these ratios to real terms. This indicates that
when there is a higher concentration of the most severe forms of misconduct—such as the
use of drugs and/or physically attacking another member at school—in relation to the amount
a school is punishing their students (through suspensions, expulsions, and police
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notification), then the school is expected to have more positive educational outcomes. On the
contrary, when a school has a higher concentration of the mid-severity forms of misconduct
(and the lowest-severity punishment, in the case of the Police Notif. Ratios) in relation to
punishment, that school is expected to experience more negative educational outcomes
(Table 3; Table 4; Table 5).44 There were no significant differences found between the
various punishment ratios (i.e. Total Punishment, Suspensions, and Police Notif.) at this level
of analysis.
While it is not possible to draw any causal stories from the level of analysis
performed in this study, this does raise some interesting questions in the context of zero
tolerance policies. It is possible to read the high Low Ratios values for all punishment types
as a proxy for a school that is particularly harsh, and perhaps adopting zero tolerance
policies, because they have high levels of punishment associated with lower-level
misconduct.45 Therefore, the findings that such schools are associated with poorer
educational outcomes might reveal the beginning of a story about the effect of harsh
discipline policies on such outcomes. The nuance of this analysis’ story, however, lies in the
fact that it does not find discipline to be universally associated with negative educational
outcomes. Rather, when a school experiences a higher density of the most severe cases of
misconduct, those schools’ punishment ratios are associated with more positive educational
outcomes. This, at the very least, provides grounds for further investigating the effects of the
harshness of punishment relative the severity of misconduct on educational outcomes. This is

44

The number of expulsions a school issues is also found to have negative effects on dropout rates, which is not
all-too-surprising given the association between the two variables. It was not possible to discern in the CPS data
sets if expulsions were included in the dropout rates, so this finding is not necessarily anything more than
collinearity.
45
This ratio is, of course, a rough proxy for what it is attempting to capture, because the punishment included in
this ratio is not necessarily all in response to the misconduct being accounted for.
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essentially the question of the effectiveness of zero tolerance policies, and this analysis
provides some fascinating leads to begin answering this question.
In addition to the effects of discipline patterns on educational outcomes, this
analysis’s findings related to the other school-level factors supports the cited existing
literature in the context of CPS. One surprising finding that strays from existing literature is
that, across all of the regression models, Black Majority schools were strongly associated
with more positive FOT rates. More specifically, all regressions found that schools with a
Black Majority were associated with an increase in FOT of at least 14 percent, significant at
1 percent (Table 3; Table 4; Table 5). While at first glance, this finding may seem to directly
contradict the existing literature that suggests that Black students typically experience poorer
educational outcomes than their peers, this finding is necessary to contextualize in the
particular composition of CPS. While Latino variables were not included in the full
regressions in an effort to control for collinearity with Bilingual, a school with marginally
more Latino and being a Latino Majority was negatively associated with educational
outcomes (Table 2).46 The Black Majority measure is designed to capture which racial group
makes is most prevalent in a school, but this is possible through a plurality (i.e. less than 50
percent). In a school district whose largest racial group is Black students (compromising 37.7
percent of the district), this plurality is not as instructive as it might be as school-level data
(CPS “Stats and Facts”). However, when one considers the interactive effects of the Racial
Density measure and Black Majority, the findings are much more aligned with existing
literature. This interaction term is highest when Black students both compose the largest
racial group in a school, and that school is also highly segregated. For this variable, all

46

These findings are not explored at length because they are only included in the partial regressions. The Latino
variable and its interactions were not significant, economically or statistically, in any of the full models.
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models found there to be incredibly large, negative effects of a school having a Black
Majority and a higher Racial Density value: each model found such schools to be associated
with at least a 31 percent lower FOT rate, significant at 1 percent (Table 3; Table 4; Table 5).
This suggests that, for a school district with as many students of color as CPS, racial
composition alone is insufficient in capturing the full dynamics of race at the school-level;
instead, racial segregation provides the fuller picture.
In terms of the demographic controls in question—IEP, Economically
Disadvantaged, and Bilingual —almost all of the findings in this analysis support the
predictions that were made based on the existing literature that all of these controls would
negatively impact educational outcomes. More specifically, across all statistically significant
findings, an increase in the percentage of students with an IEP in a school was associated
with an increase in dropout rates and a decrease in the FOT. The most significant of such
findings were in the disaggregated lagged Police Notif. Ratio regressions (Regression 8),
which found that a one percent increase in the amount of students with an IEP was associated
with a .216 percent increase in the dropout rate and a .827 percent decrease in the FOT rate
(Table 5). Though these changes are not hugely economically significant, it does make sense
that a 1 percent change in any given demographic would not change the entire culture of a
school. Though some of the findings for IEP*Percentage Black were statistically significant,
their economic significance was so small that it seems this model was unable to pick up on
the strength of the interactive effects of being both Black and having an IEP that the literature
was able to pick up on (Table 3; Table 4; Table 5).
While there were findings for EconDisad, they were not as large as expected and they
were not statistically significant across the regressions. Most of these findings concluded
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there to be a negative relationship between EconDisad and FOT—i.e. the higher the
percentage of students who were economically disadvantaged in a school, the lower the
expected FOT; however, two of the regressions also found there to be a negative relationship
between dropout rates and FOT (Table 3; Table 4; Table 5). For example, in the Total
Punishment Ratio regression 5 (with the disaggregated punishment ratios and all controls), a
one percent increase in the amount of economically disadvantaged students in a school was
associated with a 0.04 percent decrease in dropout rates (significant at 10 percent) (Table 3).
Given the extremely marginal nature of this economic significance, this finding likely just
indicates that the model was not picking up on any significant effects of EconDisad on
educational outcomes. Perhaps one reason for this was because 80.22 percent of the district is
classified as “economically disadvantaged,” so this measure was not precise enough to
capture strong effects in a one percent change in the concentration of economically
disadvantages students in any given school (CPS “CPS Stats and Facts”). Perhaps an SES
segregation index, or a dummy to designate schools with very high and very low levels of
economically disadvantaged students (i.e. 95 percent and above, and 5 percent and below,
respectively), would have captured more significant effects along socioeconomic lines.
The findings for Bilingual, however, were more significant, perhaps in part because
of the decision to exclude Hispanic from the regressions to control for the collinearity
between the two variables. In any case, all statistically significant findings demonstrated that
schools with higher percentages of students classified as Bilingual (i.e. EL learners), the
higher the associated dropout rates and the lower the associated FOT rate (Table 3; Table 4;
Table 5). This is consistent with existing literature’s findings, except for the fact that this
analysis was unable to disentangle the effects of being an EL based on one’s migration status.
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Given the literature’s suggestion that the number of generations one is removed from
migration affects one’s educational outcomes to be either positive or negative, this would be
an important distinction to make, given access to better data.
Finally, across the regressions, the Time Trend variable indicates that educational
outcomes marginally improved over time. For example, for the first regression in the Total
Punishment Ration regression, each year increase (between 2011 and 2016) was associated
with a -.278 percent change in the dropout rate (significant at 10 percent) (Table 3). Given
the focus on the three policy changes CPS made in order to reduce zero tolerance
disciplining, it is possible that the time trend might indicate the effectiveness of this policy
change by the improvement in dropout rates over time. However, given that the Time Trend
variable may also have been picking up on any other number of trends over time in CPS (not
being already controlled for with the fixed-effects), it is hard to parse out the specific policy
effects from these observations. In order to better understand the policy effects of the three
aforementioned CPS policy changes, therefore, it would be best to test the treatment effects
through a differences-in-differences approach. This was not possible within this present
analysis because there were not distinct “treatment” and “non-treatment” groups because all
schools were affected by certain district-wide policy changes, such as the changes made to
the Student Code of Conduct.

III. Caveats to Analysis
Before it is possible to draw national conclusions from this case study of discipline
policy in CPS, it is necessary to point out several caveats about the data set that have
implications for the findings. The most significant thing to note is that this analysis is only
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capable of really picking up on school-based effects, rather than student-level effects. In
other words, this analysis looks at the impact of changes in discipline on overall school
climate and the impact of that all on school-level educational outcomes. However, given the
number of other indicators that may affect school climate, apart from the controls this study
was able to take account of, this is a somewhat haphazard approach. The more ideal data set
would therefore be student-level panel data that tracks students over some set of years, and
even between schools. This is because there are grounds to believe that much of the data
analyzed in the context of this study did not contain a constant group of students. A 2009
report published by the Consortium on Chicago School Research (CCSR) has found that
student mobility in CPS has decreased since 1995 and the mobility rates are typically lower
among high school students than elementary school students (de la Torre and Gwynne 3).
However, mobility between schools is still a relevant concern, in particular because the
CCSR findings indicate that, at the high school-level, Black students are disproportionately
mobile, when compared to their peers (4). Because the sort of students that compose CPS,
and particularly black males—are typically the focus of the literature on zero tolerance, these
changes in the demographics of each school are not negligible. If the primary students
affected by school discipline policies are moving from schools before the treatment effects of
policy changes can be measured, then the “educational outcomes” this study captures will not
even be those of the students in question. This complicates the notion of finding school-level
effects because it is questionable if it is changes in “school climate” that are truly being
captured over time if the composition of the school is dramatically changing. Furthermore,
there is also a great level of inconsistency in terms of which schools are open in CPS: “Since
1994, 143 schools have opened and 60 have closed” (Sebring et al. 5). This problem is
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manifested in the fact that there is not a completely consistent sample of schools across the
years of data used for this study. The rapid closure and opening of schools also compounds
the likelihood of students being mobile between schools. All of this is to say that these
findings must be taken with a grain of salt and that further studies should seek to use panel
data, when available. The challenge is, of course, the privacy concerns in having publicly
accessible, detailed panel data for minors (especially when it comes to discipline and crimerelated data), so any such study might also have to involve original data collection.
A second problem with this analysis lies in the fallibility of data associated with the
reported number and the severity of “misconduct.” As it became very apparent in working
through the CPS Student Code of Conduct’s definition for different “Groups” of misconduct,
there is a great level of subjectivity in terms of what is considered any given level of
misconduct. And, within a context in which certain types of students are arguably racially
coded as part of the “disorder” of schools, it is not difficult to imagine the ways such students
may be misattributed as being guilty, particularly when they are in group settings where it is
more difficult for teachers or administrators to efficiently discern who is responsible in that
context. In a longitudinal study of an urban high school in the Midwest that employed
classroom observations, videotaped lessons, and interviews, Vavrus and Cole found that
“suspensions frequently occur in the absence of any physical violence or blatant verbal
abuse. Rather suspensions are often preceded by a complex series of nonviolent events when
one disruptive act among many is singled out for action by the teacher” (87). In other words,
Vavrus and Cole found that situations where there might be “disorder” in the classroom, but
no “obvious breach of disciplinary policy,” can result in suspensions when the teacher singles
out certain students as being responsible for that disorder (who may or may not have been
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directly implicated in said behavior) (88). The students who are singled out in this way are
most often female, and either Black or Latina, which supports the notion that these trends
might be racially coded in some ways (88). There is a lot more that could be looked in here
regarding the role of zero tolerance within this sort of misconduct “grey area”; however, the
purpose of introducing this literature to this analysis is to just highlight the extent to which \
misconduct gets marked as being more or less severe has the room to be inconsistent by
teacher and/or school. The punishment ratios employed in this analysis are the best proxy,
given the available data, for school harshness and zero tolerance.
A third limitation of this analysis is that it is entirely a top-down analysis, so it misses
the knowledge that can be gained from individual student experiences. The seriousness of
this limitation became apparent to me when I was discussing my thesis with a classmate who
grew up attending schools in the CPS district. I mentioned my research to her, with a clear
bent against zero tolerance and support for restorative justice models. She recounted that her
younger brother had been badly beaten up at school after the very anti-zero tolerance reforms
this analysis looks at were implemented, and the person who beat him up was only given a
two-day suspension. She suggested that this level of punishment in that context was basically
meaningless, and demeaned the seriousness of the violent act against her brother. When I
asked her about other students’ and the broader community’s perceptions of restorative
justice peace circles and other such measures, she suggested that students consider them
more or less a “joke” and, therefore, do not treat them with the seriousness that much of the
literature in support of them says they are. This insight is just one personal narrative from a
student for whom CPS’ discipline policy was a daily, lived reality, and it challenged the
understanding of zero tolerance that this analysis has come to. It is hard to know how this
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analysis would further shift if additional individual narratives were centered throughout. As
someone with no personal experience within CPS, within public schools, or within larger
urban schools, there are serious limitations that my personal experiences present. As much as
I can attempt to deconstruct the various narratives about CPS that emerge in the literature and
in common language, those deconstructions can only go so far. My own positionality is
therefore inextricably tied to the way I have processed this research. This is all to say that any
cohesive analysis of CPS discipline policy, or zero tolerance in general, must center student
voices, community voices, administrator voices, parent voices, etc. This analysis provides a
remotely detached view of such policies, which is helpful as far as big-picture analyses go.
However, if one were to develop this analysis further, integrating interviews and community
feedback in some more intentional way would improve both the integrity of this project and
its ability to serve the communities it is about.47

IV. Possible Improvement to the Model
While this analysis did reveal some critical findings about the nature of discipline and
school demographics on educational outcomes, there are ways in which the econometric
model itself has room to grow. For one, it would be useful to use the data set to estimate a
line of best fit using the multiple years worth of panel data, and then compare the predicted
values with the actual values to predict the level of punishment one would expect given a
certain degree of misconduct. The differences between the actual and predicted values here
One such work is Victor Rios’s book Punished—a work that he composed after following the lives of
approximately forty Black and Latino boys in Oakland for three years. The differences between that book and
this present analysis are grounded in their differing research methodologies—this analysis focuses more on the
analysis of quantities data and academic publications, whereas his work is grounded in personal narrative. Much
of the differences therefore ultimately come down to the particular training of the author, which is just to say
that reading this analysis alongside work like Rios’ book is critical to getting a more complete understanding of
school discipline policies and the school-to-prison pipeline.
47
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could provide an even stronger proxy for a sort of irregular level of “harshness” in the
discipline policies of a school because those residuals would be a rough measure of any
deviation from traditional punishment over time.
A second improvement to the existing analysis would be to specify and/or
sophisticate the current variables more. The current regression models have R-squared values
no higher than 0.32, suggesting the majority of the determinants of the model are not being
controlled for yet. For example, the existing literature suggests that there are a number of
interaction effects that are not captured in these models, such as those between SES and
Race, Language Status and Migration Status, Language Status and Race, Racial Segregation
and Language, etc. Part of the reason all of these interaction terms were not simply generated
using the existing variables was because of the nature of the data being school-level. With
student-level data, creating interaction terms between those variables would actually create
an interaction that finds the effects of having that particular intersectional identity; however,
with school-level data, that interaction term is a haphazard approximation for the size of the
student population with the two given identities and is, therefore, much less precise and much
less useful. Another way of better specifying the data would be to come up with better
proxies of segregation for variables other than the race-based ones. For example, one could
create a dummy variable to designate schools with very high percentages of economically
disadvantaged students, bilingual students, students with an IEP, etc. and use those as the
tested variables, rather than simply plugging in the variables straight from the data set, in the
regressions. This might provide stronger findings—particularly given the nature of CPS
being composed of 80.22 percent economically disadvantaged students, 17.17 percent ELs,
and 13.66 percent students with IEPs (CPS “Stats and Facts”). In other words, the marginal
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effects of a high school having one more percentage points of economically disadvantaged
students might be fairly negligible, whereas the effects of a school having at least 95 percent
of their students economically disadvantaged might be more significant.
And finally, this analysis could have done a more serious job to control for
collinearity. While the decision was made to remove Latino variables from the data set
because of their correlation to Bilingual, there were a number of other variables that were
correlated (albeit, to a lesser degree) that likely caused a certain degree of collinearity in the
model. For example, Black and Econ Disad have a correlational coefficient of 0.23, Econ
Disad and IEP has a correlational coefficient of 0.412, and—more concerning—the
disaggregated punishment ratios also were positively correlated to similar, or greater,48
degrees. This is all to say that, given more time to work to work with the data, a less collinear
and more well-developed proxy for “zero tolerance”/”harshness” needs to be developed.
There is a challenge inherent to dealing with collinearity with this sort of data, given the
strong connections between race variables with others like SES, punishment trends, etc., so
interaction terms might be one way to accommodate to these dynamics. So much of the
literature on school discipline provides reason to believe that all of the same determinants
identified in this study for educational outcomes are also determinants of punishment itself.49
Because punishment was treated as another independent variable in this study, this posses
immediate concerns for collinearity.

48

One particularly concerning finding was that the disaggregated Suspension Ratios had correlational
coefficients all 0.94 or greater with one and other.
49
For example, according to the literature review I completed for my Applied Econometrics final paper, I found
that existing literature suggests there to be some relationship between school discipline and race, gender,
disability status, EL status, high-stakes testing schedules (which was identified as a confounding variable in this
analysis), and school quality measures.
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Chapter 5
Policy Recommendations
Given these findings regarding the effects of zero tolerance school discipline policies
on educational outcomes in the context of Chicago Public Schools, there are larger lessons
that can be drawn about the role of zero tolerance policies at the national level.
Because “zero tolerance” has come to mean different things across states, school districts,
and even schools, surveying the levels of possible change will help provide a useful
background on how to target school discipline change at various levels of policy. This
chapter will begin by drawing on the conclusions from the case study of Chicago Public
Schools to the national context and will then survey the possible levels of change in the
system of school discipline, before making general policy recommendations.

A. Conclusions and Lessons for Nation at Large
It would be haphazard—at this level of analysis—to make sweeping conclusions for
discipline policies nationally based on the results from the case study on Chicago Public
Schools alone; however, there are a few interesting findings that might inform future research
about the application of these findings to a national context. For one, this study indicates that
race matters to educational outcomes; however, the effects of race are largely moderated by
racial segregation. Segregation seems to have a sort of multiplier effect in that, when many
students from disadvantaged groups (either racially, or possible also socioeconomically, in
terms of their language status, etc.) are concentrated within a school, then the other stressors
that negatively effect educational outcomes become more pronounced. For example, highstakes testing is critically important for school funding, especially for public schools with
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high concentrations of working class students. Such schools are also likely to have larger
communities of color, immigrant students, EL students, etc. because of the strong
relationship between these variables. Chicago is a typical case of the sort of district most
directly affected by zero tolerance policies: as a large urban school district with high
concentrations of students of color who come from working class families and a rate of
school closures, schools in Chicago are under a large deal of stress to ensure their own
positive educational outcomes. Such conditions place teachers and administrators in a unique
position where policing to ensure “order” at their school is sometimes viewed as a necessary
step in order to make sure that they keep their schools, and community, afloat. Therefore, this
analysis is not intended to assign guilt onto those who run highly-segregated schools like
many of those in Chicago, but instead it seeks to push for more critical conversation about
the larger systems at play that lead to teachers and administrators in schools across the
country resorting to zero tolerance policies in the first place. Given the findings in this
analysis that the relative harshness of discipline matters to the educational outcomes of a
school, these findings about segregation and discipline carry particular importance, even
outside of Chicago’s context. Also given that Arne Duncan went on to lead the US
Department of Education on the platform of scaling the same sort of test-based accountability
systems and harsher discipline he developed in Chicago to the national context, this case
study of CPS schools is particularly critical in thinking about the dynamics of testing,
funding, and discipline across the nation. This is not to say the conditions of CPS are exactly
the same as those at all other schools in the nation, but rather that the case study of CPS
validates existing findings regarding the dangers of zero tolerance, particularly in the current
system of test-based accountability and funding.
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B. Surveying Levels of Change
Federal-Level Policy Change: Focusing in on GFSA and Due Process
Given the lack of a cohesive national policy that defines the practice of zero tolerance
across all US schools, there are a number of levels at which discipline policy changes might
be addressed. The first possibility of change at the federal level would be to repeal or amend
the existing federal Gun-Free Schools Act in response to its very loose definition of what a
“dangerous weapon” is. This could take the form of repealing the GFSA and introducing an
entirely new bill with clearer due process protections for all students, introducing amendment
to the existing law to narrow the definition of “dangerous weapons,” or implementing a more
secure enforcement mechanism to ensure that schools are actually being held responsible for
their protection (or lack thereof) of students’ due process rights. Alternatively at the federal
level, the Supreme Court could rule against the constitutionality of the GFSA because of its
systematic neglect of the due process protections required under the 14th Amendment. Given
the current political climate with the Republican control of Washington and the conservative
majority on the Supreme Court, this level of change is likely to be politically unfeasible, at
least for the next four years, if not much longer. This level of change also would not
necessarily cause the dynamics of moral panic around “deviancy” and “disorder” in schools
to be eliminated in any ways; it seems more likely that this level of policy change would
happen only once those broader shifts in the culture around juvenile crime and school
discipline occur within American society. Without these shifts, then there is always a risk
that the systems in place governing school discipline will fail to actually ensure due process
protections for all students. Therefore, it is critical to consider other, more bottom-up
methods for catalyzing change in the space of school discipline.
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State-Level Politics: Minimizing Sentencing Rules
The next possible level of change would be state-level reform. This is the status quo
condition means of responding to zero tolerance policies; however, there is no uniform way
in which states respond to zero tolerance. For example, Illinois has attempted to tackle zero
tolerance by setting standards for discipline data:
Illinois passed legislation in 2014 that requires all publicly-funded schools to report
data on the issuance of out-of-school suspensions, expulsions, and removals to
alternative settings in lieu of another disciplinary action. (Advocacy &
Communication Solutions)50
The Michigan State Board of Education adopted the “Model Code of Student Conduct 2014,”
which strongly urged school districts against the use of zero tolerance disciple and
“articulat[ed] the importance of integrating proactive steps of evidence-based, pro-social
development practices into the school culture and sustaining them as vital elements of school
operations” (8). Other states, such as Oklahoma, have shifted their focus to increased “mental
health counseling and social services” (8). Another alternative policy route that is being
employed by some states is utilizing positive reinforcement mechanisms (rather than negative
ones) to motivate positive behavior by students. For example, Louisiana has passed state
legislation “requiring that the school master plans in various localities prepare and include
provisions for staff and administrator training on positive school behavioral supports and
practices” (8). According to existing literature’s findings on the effects of such “School-Wide
Behavioral Interventions,” such positive-reinforcement methods are associated with
“improved academic performance, better social behavior, and reductions in referrals to the
principal’s office for discipline polices” at the elementary school-level (Boccanfuso and
Kuhfeld 8). Therefore, there are a number of approaches for state governments to take in

50

This is the same sort of data that was employed for this analysis.

Kaul 101
dealing with school discipline—including new legislation, increased funding for social
services and positive behavioral interventions (perhaps in collaboration with non-profit
organizations), and more. There are a multitude possibilities at this level of governance to
make wide-sweeping changes in the dynamics of school discipline, so each state seeking to
make such changes should tailor whatever policy changes they pursue to the particular
circumstances within their state. Given the potentially significant variance between districts,
even within the same state, it may be preferable to pursue district-level changes for some of
these policy changes.

District and School-Level Changes
Another possible level of change would be at the school district or school level, as
can be seen in the case of CPS’ reforms. In terms of district change, policies could introduce
and enforce some regularized means of ensuring due process protections for students, or even
just work to eliminate the heavy presence of police on elementary and high school campuses.
When one considers the role of zero tolerance in normalizing the school-to-prison pipeline,
the presence of police surveillance within schools—labeling a food fight as a misdemeanor—
cannot be overstated. Accordingly, one of the most popular alternatives to zero tolerance is
the introduction of restorative justice models, either by the school district, or through private
organizations or non-profits. These programs target the underlying sources of conflict that
are responsible for school misconduct and have been found to be critical in improving school
safety and educational outcomes for schools that have adopted the model. If these programs
are successful at this level of change, it is possible to work them up through the system to the
state and federal levels.
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For example, there is research that suggests that the restorative justice (RJ) model is
better equipped to address the underlying dynamics of power that might be responsible for
students acting out in school in the first place:
Tyler (2006) argues that by giving people, particularly students, a voice in the
decision-making and procedural justice process, they will view institutional power as
more legitimate and fair. Tyler also makes the case that empowering youth may lead
to better self-regulation without the need for formal discipline. Zehr (2002) and other
argue that RJ results in a shift in how discipline is applied, which increases student
perception about fairness of educator actions, thereby leading to a greater compliance
as they see the school order as having legitimacy. (Fronius et al.5)
This literature all captures the role of perceived legitimacy from the perspective of the
individual committing the “crime” because the model depends on the understanding that “the
key to motivating compliance based on internal social values is to maintain the legitimacy of
the law and of legal authorities” (Tyler 317). The restorative justice model is therefore
responsive to concerns that harsher, zero tolerance approaches are unjust in their unequal
application of punishment to students of color, students with disabilities, etc. Such practices
often diminish the trust the most vulnerable students have for authority and can make them
feel even more excluded from the traditional “social order” of their schools. Inherent in the
dualist zero tolerance framework is an understanding of Us vs. Them—those whose behavior
is socially acceptable, and those whose behavior is “deviant.” With more rigid systems of
punishment that frame students who commit such behavioral infractions as inherently
“violent,” “deviant,” or “at risk,” there is a strong potential to reinforce the original social
controls that may have cause the students to act out in the first place. There are a multitude of
schools and districts employing effective models of restorative justice that might be worth
investigating more closely, should a district be seeking to tailor a model of restorative justice
to their own community. Many of these programs involve things like peer juries, which allow
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students to have a voice in discipline proceedings and to see themselves as a critical member
of their community. The power of models like the peer jury is that they reverse many of the
hierarchies that emerge within schools that have a harsh focus on “discipline” as a part of
their school culture.

C. Policy Recommendations
Given these various policy options, it is hard to suggest that there is any singular
combination of changes that would be the most effective. What is more of a factor in the case
of making changes in the US education system is the presence of political coalitions willing
and able to fight for those changes. Also given the particular political order at the moment in
the US with the Republican majority at multiple levels of politics, it seems like the methods
of change that would be most likely to work are more grass-roots, or district-level changes,
rather than federal policy change. In particular, an overhaul of federal school policies or the
GFSA on the grounds of civil rights and due process protections seems particularly unlikely,
given Jeff Sessions’ position as Attorney General and Besty DeVos’ as the Secretary of
Education. The system of “school choice” is one that heavily incentivizes the same test-based
accountability systems that have contributed to the rise of zero tolerance policies in the first
place.
There are a number of examples of approaches to shifting away from zero tolerance
that have been suggested in the preceding section, any of which could serve as models for
future change. The main recommendation that I would make to any policymakers engaged
with work in school discipline is that it is necessary to be aware of the multiplier effects of
segregation on other determinants of educational outcomes. Discipline policies do not exist
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within a vacuum, but are rather in constant conversation with other systemic forces at play—
including, but not limited to racial, socioeconomic, and linguistic segregation. Making real
changes in the current systems of zero tolerance policies will therefore require the same sort
of multi-disciplinary approach employed in this analysis. That is, understanding the ways in
which zero tolerance is deeply rooted in dualistic, media-driven representations of youth, for
example, reveals that any successful alternative to zero tolerance must be doing work to
deconstruct such representations. Given the complexity of the historical, political, and
ideological forces at play when it comes to zero tolerance policies, it is therefore necessary to
engage in whatever positive changes to discipline are possible within those present contexts.
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Concluding Thoughts
The story of zero tolerance policies in US schools reveals a profound deal about the
dynamics of the American education system in the past several decades; however, it also
provides significant insight into bigger questions on how certain communities become
defined, by their very nature of existence, as somehow “deviant” from “traditional” social
order. Implicit in harsh discipline models that treat different groups disproportionately is a
value judgment about which types of people and which behaviors are considered to be
“productive,” “moral,” or otherwise conforming to the dominant social order of American
society. Therefore, the ways in which particular identities become policed at the level of
schools has tremendous implications on American political order as a whole. David Labaree
aptly reflects, “Schools, it seems, occupy an awkward position at the intersection between
what we hope society will become and what we think it really is, between political ideals and
economic realities” (41). Schools serve as both the origin and sites of reproduction for many
of the inequalities one can observe more broadly within American society, so the necessity to
critically engage with what is happening within our schools today cannot be overstated.
Ultimately, the public narrative over who is a “good” or “hardworking” student is moderated
by the discourse around discipline. The increasingly dualistic representations of children in
the context of US schools reflects a pervasive fixed mindset about the possibilities of
learning and behavior by students, but also of entire marginalized communities. These same
notions of “deviancy” and “disorder” seep into other aspects of the American consciousness,
subliminally affecting how the political order comes to define itself.
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Tables
Table 1. Summary Statistics by School Year (2011-2016)
Obs.

Mean
2011-2012

S.D.

Min

Max

Educational Outcomes:
Freshman On-track Rate
Dropout Rate

85
87

78.614
4.884

16.007
5.732

0
.1

98.6
32.8

Race (by %):
White
Black
Latino

87
87
87

6.123
51.710
37.613

6.123
51.710
37.613

10.620
38.883
34.297

48.9
99.8
98.5

Racial Density Index

87

0.678

0.276

0.114

0.996

Demographic Controls (by %):
Bilingual
IEP
Economically Disadvantaged

87
87
87

5.128
14.876
89.610

6.121
5.983
14.421

0
4.05
34.35

26
29.74
100

% Misconduct Resulting in a…
ISS
OSS
Police Notification

87
87
87

29.2
43.339
6.355

25.733
27.089
10.518

0
4.8
0

87.9
98.1
60.4

Number of Students Expelled

87

1.241

2.449

0

12

Number of Misconduct by Level:
Low Level
Mid Level
High Level

87
87
87

491.920
346.195
56.644

727.970
524.727
51.418

1
3
1

4416
3753
225

Total Punishment Ratio
Low Punishment Ratio
Mid Punishment Ratio
High Punishment Ratio

87
87
87
87

1.610
0.839
0.631
0.140

1.202
0.965
0.432
0.105

0.603
0.020
0.150
.007

7.950
6.766
2.833
0.515

Suspension Ratio
Low Suspension Ratio
Mid Suspension Ratio
High Suspension Ratio

87
87
87
87

1.809
0.931
0.715
0.162

1.600
1.597
1.158
0.137

0.832
0.031
0.151
0.007

12.286
7.230
4.857
0.6

Police Notif. Ratio
Low Police Ratio

80
80

101.638
64.875

204.353
156.657

1.657
0.179

1175.5
990.5
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Mid Police Ratio
High Police Ratio

80
80

30.716
6.046

46.911
11.081

0.714
0.118

229.5
72.5

2012-2013
Educational Outcomes:
Freshman On-track Rate
Dropout Rate

82
85

79.552
4.64

14.657
4.924

7.3
0

99.3
23.7

Race (by %):
White
Black
Latino

86
86
86

6.349
51.457
37.570

10.859
39.112
34.175

0
1
0

48.2
99.5
97.1

Racial Density Index

86

0.676

0.275

0.107

0.990

Demographic Controls (by %):
Bilingual
IEP
Economically Disadvantaged

86
86
86

5.019
14.844
89.503

6.071
6.010
14.470

0
4.05
34.35

26
29.74
100

% Misconduct Resulting in a…
ISS
OSS
Police Notification

86
86
86

31.272
42.353
7.472

24.910
26.332
11.265

0
1.5
0

78
100
50

Number of Students Expelled

86

1.116

1.818

0

7

Number of Misconduct by Level:
Low Level
Mid Level
High Level

86
86
86

424.767
358.105
56.291

467.309
402.365
53.515

0
0
0

1959
2266
270

Total Punishment Ratio
Low Punishment Ratio
Mid Punishment Ratio
High Punishment Ratio

86
86
86
86

1.523
0.759
0.619
0.145

1.090
0.814
0.407
0.132

0.667
0
0
0

7.408
5.469
2.167
0.667

Suspension Ratio
Low Suspension Ratio
Mid Suspension Ratio
High Suspension Ratio

86
86
86
86

1.703
0.833
0.698
0.172

1.207
0.872
0.481
0.173

0.940
0
0
0

7.615
5.469
2.753
1

Police Notif. Ratio
Low Police Ratio
Mid Police Ratio
High Police Ratio

80
80
80
8

100.994
55.847
39.481
5.666

213.408
144.501
85.613
14.281

2
0
0
0

1305
970
533
92
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2013-2014
Educational Outcomes:
Freshman On-track Rate
Dropout Rate

85
87

81.005
4.662

13.248
5.032

46
0

100
24

Race (by %):
White
Black
Latino

87
87
87

6.270
51.071
38.039

10.751
38.785
33.938

10.752
38.785
33.939

24
48
98.4

Racial Density Index

87

0.671

0.272

0.272

1

Demographic Controls (by %):
Bilingual
IEP
Economically Disadvantaged

87
87
87

5.334
15.193
88.606

6.435
6.117
14.685

6.435
6.117
14.685

27.34
34.2
100

% Misconduct Resulting in a…
ISS
OSS
Police Notification

87
87
87

30.157
43.294
5.120

26.345
25.412
8.065

0
0
0

100
98.5
61

Number of Students Expelled

87

0.966

1.9979

0

11

Number of Misconduct by Level:
Low Level
Mid Level
High Level

87
87
87

489.460
302.828
57.425

655.131
296.812
52.544

0
0
0

3305
1223
240

Total Punishment Ratio
Low Punishment Ratio
Mid Punishment Ratio
High Punishment Ratio

87
87
87
87

1.585
0.811
0.627
0.147

1.109
0.856
0.394
0.120

0.709
0
0
0

7.103
5.955
2.162
0.526

Suspension Ratio
Low Suspension Ratio
Mid Suspension Ratio
High Suspension Ratio

87
87
87
87

1.733
0.879
0.691
0.164

1.265
0.955
0.470
0.138

0.748
0
0
0

7.914
6.638
2.718
0.6

Police Notif. Ratio
Low Police Ratio
Mid Police Ratio
High Police Ratio

79
79
79
79

85.339
50.693
28.177
6.470

113.773
77.334
38.065
10.167

1.639
0
0.893
0.378

553
298
196
70
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2014-2015
Educational Outcomes:
Freshman On-track Rate
Dropout Rate

91
91

81.008
4.543

13.160
4.969

43.9
0.2

100
25.4

Race (by %):
White
Black
Latino

94
94
94

6.643
49.548
38.986

11.056
38.085
33.231

0
1.1
0

48.2
99.7
98.9

Racial Density Index

94

0.654

0.269

0.096

0.994

Demographic Controls (by %):
Bilingual
IEP
Economically Disadvantaged

94
94
94

5.907
15.227
85.671

7.003
6.807
16.140

0
2.685
30.891

24.818
30.605
99.462

% Misconduct Resulting in a…
ISS
OSS
Police Notification

94
94
94

28.536
43.530
6.599

25.562
27.649
8.850

0
0.5
0

97.5
100
36.9

Number of Students Expelled

94

1.127

2.241

0

11

Number of Misconduct by Level:
Low Level
Mid Level
High Level

94
94
94

680.596
339.957
60.202

1053.897
392.683
58.330

1
6
0

5667
2254
390

Total Punishment Ratio
Low Punishment Ratio
Mid Punishment Ratio
High Punishment Ratio

94
94
94
94

1.728
0.976
0.611
0.140

1.623
1.389
0.423
0.117

0.707
0.018
0.012
0

12.729
10.486
2.941
0.605

Suspension Ratio
Low Suspension Ratio
Mid Suspension Ratio
High Suspension Ratio

94
94
94
94

1.883
1.053
0.674
0.156

1.840
1.534
0.503
0.135

0.833
0.021
0.013
0

14.237
11.728
3.846
0.667

Police Notif. Ratio
Low Police Ratio
Mid Police Ratio
High Police Ratio

89
89
89
89

122.287
88.413
28.092
5.782

380.900
365.257
51.102
9.380

2.711
0.1
0.994
0

3430
3378
350
50.5
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2015-2016
Educational Outcomes:
Freshman On-track Rate
Dropout Rate

81
82

80.101
4.227

14.430
3.912

5.9
0

98.9
21.4

Race (by %):
White
Black
Latino

85
85
85

6.52
49.819
38.974

11.226
38.438
33.720

0
0.6
0

48.4
99.7
98.3

Racial Density Index

85

0.662

0.269

0.089

0.994

Demographic Controls (by %):
Bilingual
IEP
Economically Disadvantaged

85
85
85

6.474
16.029
88.479

7.600
7.151
15.358

9
3.85
34.3

30.84
33.83
100

% Misconduct Resulting in a…
ISS
OSS
Police Notification

85
85
85

29.034
40.053
7.06

26.504
27.605
11.234

0
0.5
0

95.2
100
78.8

Number of Students Expelled

85

0.8

1.771

0

11

Number of Misconduct by Level:
Low Level
Mid Level
High Level

85
85
85

427.353
303.906
57.965

587.783
465.032
64.138

1
5
0

2792
2783
387

Total Punishment Ratio
Low Punishment Ratio
Mid Punishment Ratio
High Punishment Ratio

85
85
85
85

1.778
0.906
0.703
0.169

1.595
0.957
0.756
0.172

0.655
0.019
0.026
0

13
5.571
6.286
1.143

Suspension Ratio
Low Suspension Ratio
Mid Suspension Ratio
High Suspension Ratio

85
85
85
85

3.971
1.857
1.745
0.369

19.578
8.413
9.480
1.724

0.739
0.021
0.026
0

182
78
88
16

Police Notif. Ratio
Low Police Ratio
Mid Police Ratio
High Police Ratio

78
78
78
78

68.811
40.611
22.807
5.392

102.543
73.108
32.548
8.499

1.269
0.0770
0.567
0

533.5
444.333
201.667
56

Kaul 120
Table 2. Preliminary Step-wise Regressions for Misconduct-Total Punishment Ratio
VARIABLES
Total Punishment Ratio
# Expelled
Time Trend

(1)
Dropout
-0.208
(0.169)
0.478***
(0.110)
-0.0708
(0.163)

(1)
FOT
1.184**
(0.500)
-1.217***
(0.324)
0.323
(0.482)

Black
Latino

(2)
Dropout
-0.0578
(0.166)
0.375***
(0.107)
-0.0686
(0.157)
0.0538***
(0.0139)
0.0261*
(0.0158)

(2)
FOT
0.716
(0.491)
-0.933***
(0.317)
0.318
(0.465)
-0.180***
(0.0412)
-0.116**
(0.0468)

Racial Density
Black Majority
Latino Majority
Racial Density*Black
Racial Density*Latino

(3)
Dropout
-0.0186
(0.166)
0.346***
(0.107)
-0.0625
(0.156)

(3)
FOT
0.424
(0.479)
-0.744**
(0.309)
0.275
(0.450)

6.261
(11.32)
1.014
(2.363)
3.032
(2.272)
-1.224
(11.47)
-6.271
(11.47)

-0.711
(32.68)
3.723
(6.818)
-12.22*
(6.557)
-22.74
(33.10)
2.746
(33.12)

IEP

Observations
R-squared

78.43***
(1.831)

422
0.050

422
0.051

0.705
(1.443)

92.44***
(4.269)

422
422
0.121
0.117
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.726***
(0.109)
-0.00184
(0.0974)
-0.169***
(0.0468)
104.4***
(4.171)
422
0.223

0.460
(2.148)

91.69***
(6.198)

422
0.134

422
0.173

422
0.279

Econ Disad
4.556***
(0.621)

(4)
FOT
0.353
(0.461)
-0.626**
(0.300)
0.534
(0.442)

0.373***
(0.0354)
-0.0141
(0.0318)
0.00302
(0.0153)
-1.062
(1.361)

Bilingual

Constant

(4)
Dropout
0.0668
(0.150)
0.258***
(0.0979)
-0.215
(0.144)
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Table 3. Regressions for Misconduct-Total Punishment Ratio

VARIABLES
Total Punishment Ratio

(5)
Dropout
0.115
(0.147)

(5)
FOT
0.154
(0.446)

(6)
LagDropout
0.287*
(0.170)

(6)
LagFOT
-0.159
(0.458)

Low Punish Ratio
Mid Punish Ratio
High Punish Ratio
# Expulsions
Time Trend
Racial Density
Black Majority
IEP
Bilingual
Econ Disad
Racial Density*Black Maj
IEP*Percentage Black

Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.175*
(0.0970)
-0.277**
(0.141)
0.978
(1.657)
-0.698
(1.298)
0.117
(0.0817)
0.175***
(0.0504)
-0.0330
(0.0216)
-0.273
(2.686)
0.00313***
(0.00107)

-0.322
(0.294)
0.639
(0.427)
12.22**
(5.019)
16.43***
(3.933)
-0.611**
(0.247)
-0.562***
(0.153)
-0.129**
(0.0654)
-34.71***
(8.137)
0.00101
(0.00323)

2.271
(1.536)
422
0.319

98.50***
(4.651)
422
0.283

0.00827
(0.112)
-0.202
(0.162)
-2.363
(1.906)
-2.359
(1.497)
0.168*
(0.0946)
0.0760
(0.0592)
0.0416*
(0.0248)
1.938
(3.093)
0.00220*
(0.00123)

0.0520
(0.303)
0.453
(0.437)
11.40**
(5.141)
14.86***
(4.038)
-0.704***
(0.255)
-0.396**
(0.160)
-0.147**
(0.0669)
-31.43***
(8.342)
0.00224
(0.00333)

-1.756
100.3***
(1.786)
(4.816)
420
420
0.230
0.225
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(7)
Dropout

(7)
FOT

(8)
LagDropout

(8)
LagFOT

0.0823
(0.205)
0.548
(0.468)
-2.531
(1.703)
0.165*
(0.0970)
-0.279**
(0.140)
1.305
(1.666)
-0.772
(1.295)
0.117
(0.0818)
0.181***
(0.0504)
-0.0414*
(0.0222)
-0.347
(2.679)
0.00318***
(0.00107)

0.798
(0.620)
-2.718*
(1.414)
8.365
(5.143)
-0.299
(0.293)
0.643
(0.424)
10.77**
(5.032)
16.73***
(3.911)
-0.639***
(0.247)
-0.581***
(0.152)
-0.104
(0.0671)
-34.59***
(8.089)
0.00109
(0.00322)

0.108
(0.237)
1.124**
(0.544)
-2.273
(2.018)
0.00220
(0.112)
-0.202
(0.162)
-1.934
(1.916)
-2.443
(1.493)
0.178*
(0.0946)
0.0789
(0.0590)
0.0340
(0.0255)
1.924
(3.082)
0.00214*
(0.00123)

0.449
(0.637)
-2.771*
(1.467)
6.687
(5.438)
0.0658
(0.302)
0.454
(0.435)
10.13**
(5.162)
15.09***
(4.023)
-0.739***
(0.255)
-0.404**
(0.159)
-0.127*
(0.0687)
-31.41***
(8.305)
0.00245
(0.00332)

2.944*
(1.640)
422
0.323

97.58***
(4.953)
422
0.291

-1.457
(1.905)
420
0.236

99.82***
(5.133)
420
0.232
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Table 4. Regressions for Misconduct-Suspensions Ratio
VARIABLES
Suspension Ratio
$
Low Suspension Ratio

(5)
Dropout
0.0101
(0.0222)

(5)
FOT
0.0234
(0.0673)

(6)
LagDropout
0.00914
(0.0257)

(6)
LagFOT
0.00410
(0.0691)

Mid Suspension Ratio
High Suspension Ratio
# Expulsions
Time Trend
Racial Density
Black Majority
IEP
Bilingual
Econ Disad
Racial Density*Black Maj
IEP*Percentage Black

Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.172*
(0.0970)
-0.276*
(0.141)
0.960
(1.658)
-0.611
(1.296)
0.118
(0.0819)
0.175***
(0.0505)
-0.0333
(0.0216)
-0.344
(2.686)
0.00310***
(0.00107)

-0.325
(0.294)
0.636
(0.427)
12.23**
(5.020)
16.56***
(3.925)
-0.608**
(0.248)
-0.562***
(0.153)
-0.129**
(0.0654)
-34.80***
(8.132)
0.000944
(0.00324)

2.479*
(1.503)
422
0.318

98.71***
(4.549)
422
0.283

-6.12e-05
(0.113)
-0.190
(0.163)
-2.469
(1.912)
-2.182
(1.500)
0.165*
(0.0951)
0.0748
(0.0594)
0.0406
(0.0249)
1.780
(3.101)
0.00215*
(0.00124)

0.0572
(0.303)
0.442
(0.438)
11.48**
(5.142)
14.77***
(4.033)
-0.700***
(0.256)
-0.396**
(0.160)
-0.146**
(0.0669)
-31.34***
(8.339)
0.00225
(0.00333)

-1.113
99.91***
(1.751)
(4.708)
420
420
0.225
0.225
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(7)
Dropout

(7)
FOT

(8)
LagDropout

(8)
LagFOT

0.0560
(0.186)
0.403
(0.298)
-2.403*
(1.338)
0.162*
(0.0967)
-0.281**
(0.141)
1.246
(1.660)
-0.762
(1.294)
0.116
(0.0817)
0.181***
(0.0504)
-0.0416*
(0.0220)
-0.364
(2.676)
0.00320***
(0.00107)

0.718
(0.562)
-2.069**
(0.901)
8.129**
(4.042)
-0.290
(0.292)
0.631
(0.425)
11.13**
(5.013)
16.87***
(3.909)
-0.619**
(0.247)
-0.582***
(0.152)
-0.102
(0.0664)
-34.58***
(8.080)
0.000876
(0.00322)

0.0791
(0.215)
0.443
(0.351)
-2.753*
(1.591)
-0.00986
(0.112)
-0.193
(0.162)
-2.161
(1.914)
-2.362
(1.498)
0.167*
(0.0948)
0.0786
(0.0592)
0.0313
(0.0253)
1.811
(3.090)
0.00221*
(0.00124)

0.407
(0.579)
-1.498
(0.944)
6.307
(4.279)
0.0812
(0.302)
0.435
(0.437)
10.69**
(5.151)
15.04***
(4.030)
-0.715***
(0.255)
-0.403**
(0.159)
-0.125*
(0.0682)
-31.31***
(8.314)
0.00227
(0.00333)

3.123**
(1.539)
422
0.323

96.57***
(4.647)
422
0.292

-0.412
(1.791)
420
0.231

98.31***
(4.818)
420
0.229
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Table 5. Regressions for Misconduct-Police Notification Ratio
VARIABLES
Police Notif Ratio

(5)
Dropout
0.00198**
(0.000946)

(5)
FOT
-0.00469*
(0.00285)

(6)
LagDropout
-0.00186*
(0.00111)

(6)
LagFOT
0.00238
(0.00299)

Low Police Ratio
Mid Police Ratio
High Police Ratio
# Expulsions
Time Trend
Racial Density
Black Majority
IEP
Bilingual
EconDisad
Racial Density*Black Maj
IEP*Percentage Black

Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.187*
(0.101)
-0.283*
(0.151)
0.701
(1.795)
-1.092
(1.392)
0.133
(0.0909)
0.173***
(0.0539)
-0.0373
(0.0239)
0.290
(2.920)
0.00301***
(0.00117)

-0.369
(0.304)
0.700
(0.454)
13.18**
(5.401)
17.87***
(4.188)
-0.740***
(0.274)
-0.547***
(0.162)
-0.122*
(0.0718)
-37.34***
(8.787)
0.00220
(0.00351)

2.716
(1.697)
390
0.321

98.99***
(5.108)
390
0.276

-0.0412
(0.117)
-0.156
(0.173)
-2.418
(2.069)
-2.290
(1.608)
0.221**
(0.105)
0.0482
(0.0635)
0.0416
(0.0274)
2.098
(3.365)
0.00168
(0.00135)

0.111
(0.315)
0.451
(0.467)
11.13**
(5.567)
15.16***
(4.327)
-0.818***
(0.283)
-0.357**
(0.171)
-0.132*
(0.0738)
-33.69***
(9.056)
0.00406
(0.00363)

-1.399
99.04***
(1.972)
(5.308)
389
389
0.226
0.203
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(7)
Dropout

(7)
FOT

(8)
LagDropout

(8)
LagFOT

0.00337***
(0.00112)
0.000923
(0.00485)
-0.0538**
(0.0259)
0.163
(0.101)
-0.283*
(0.150)
0.979
(1.792)
-0.747
(1.388)
0.128
(0.0903)
0.168***
(0.0538)
-0.0364
(0.0238)
-0.140
(2.898)
0.00302***
(0.00116)

-0.00605*
(0.00341)
-0.00687
(0.0147)
0.0708
(0.0784)
-0.341
(0.305)
0.694
(0.454)
12.72**
(5.434)
17.54***
(4.210)
-0.731***
(0.274)
-0.546***
(0.163)
-0.122*
(0.0722)
-36.87***
(8.789)
0.00214
(0.00351)

-0.00194
(0.00133)
0.00244
(0.00564)
-0.0262
(0.0301)
-0.0441
(0.117)
-0.149
(0.174)
-2.180
(2.083)
-2.315
(1.616)
0.216**
(0.105)
0.0528
(0.0638)
0.0391
(0.0276)
2.062
(3.365)
0.00172
(0.00135)

-0.00202
(0.00357)
0.0138
(0.0151)
0.120
(0.0806)
0.172
(0.314)
0.484
(0.464)
10.73*
(5.573)
14.13***
(4.323)
-0.827***
(0.282)
-0.331*
(0.171)
-0.139*
(0.0739)
-32.69***
(9.003)
0.00426
(0.00361)

2.823*
(1.685)
390
0.333

98.80***
(5.110)
390
0.278

-1.297
(1.974)
389
0.227

98.96***
(5.280)
389
0.214

